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I. INTRODUCTION
The intersection of media and justice has emerged as a focal
point in recent years.1  More than just a debate over “cameras in the
courtroom,” legal scholars, media experts, and, most recently, cogni-
tive psychologists have begun to explore the broader links between
the American news media’s preoccupation with crime—the “if it
bleeds, it leads” edict—and our burgeoning prison industrial com-
plex.2  This Article will build upon this research through the examina-
tion of a dynamic that is largely unexplored—mediated crime
discourse, social cognition, and racial disparities in the administration
of justice.  It does so within the context of the U.S. juvenile justice
system, whose postmodern orientation, practices, and legal outcomes
suggest a significant interplay among the three.
During the 1990s, juveniles of color3 were the focus of what some
have called a classic “moral panic” in this country, during which politi-
cians, educators, religious leaders, law enforcement, and much of the
public were consumed by the looming threat posed by America’s
1. In January 2009, for example, the Stanford Law Review devoted its symposium to the
topic of “Media, Justice, and the Law.”  Symposium, Media, Justice, and the Law, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1333 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 400–05 (2006) (argu-
ing that the news media’s treatment of violent crime has impacted public opinion and
increased support for punitive criminal and juvenile justice policies); Barry C. Feld, Race,
Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV.
1447, 1517–18, 1527–28 (2003) (arguing that the increase in black youth homicide rates in
the late 1980s “provided the immediate political impetus to ‘get tough’ and to ‘crack
down’ on youth crime” and that the “[n]ews media coverage . . . overemphasiz[ed] the
role of minority perpetrators in the commission of violent crime,” so that  “distorted news
coverage  . . . allows [politicians] to enact racial animus in the guise of crime policies”);
Rachel Lyon, Media, Race, Crime, and Punishment: Re-Framing Stereotypes in Crime and Human
Rights Issues, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 742 (2009) (linking crime news with increased incar-
ceration rates); William R. Montross, Jr. & Patrick Mulvaney, Virtue and Vice: Who Will Report
on the Failings of the American Criminal Justice System?, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1429–36 (2009)
(arguing that American crime reporting is “succinct, superficial, and devoid of context”
and that criminal justice reporting is practically nonexistent); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1551–57 (2005) (explaining the link between media
coverage of violent crime news stories involving racial minorities and the high number of
arrests of racial minorities).  See generally RICHARD L. FOX ET AL., TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA FRENZY 199–203 (2d ed. 2007) (outlining five broad findings
that help delineate central aspects of the tabloid justice era and emphasizing the detrimen-
tal consequences of the “entertainment-ization” of increased legal coverage in the media).
3. This Article defines “juveniles of color” according to its definition under the Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (“JJDPA”), as African-American, Na-
tive American, Hispanic, Pacific Islander, and Asian-American. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(j)(6)
(2009) (defining “minority populations” as African-Americans, American Indians, Asians,
Pacific Islanders, and Hispanics).
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youth.4  At its center was the American news media.5  Long criticized
for overemphasizing the prevalence and nature of adult crime,6 the
media’s depiction of juvenile suspects during this period was nearly as
imbalanced.  Amid several high profile crimes in the late 1980s, the
media abandoned its traditional posture of confidentiality and re-
straint toward child lawbreakers in favor of a meme that in many re-
spects harkened back to the days of the eugenics movement.7  In
1989, the term “wilding” was introduced into journalists’ lexicon to
describe the pastime of this “new breed” of adolescents, who terror-
ized at random for the sheer pleasure of doing so.8  Six years later,
these “Godless” and “deviant” creatures were labeled adolescent
“superpredators.”9  They suffered from a condition of “abject moral
poverty,” the media relayed, and had “absolutely no respect for
human life and no sense of the future.”10  The iconographic image of
the juvenile superpredator proved to be an especially salient symbol
for a discourse whose racial connotations were unambiguous: Juvenile
offenders were violent, amoral, and dark.  With the emergence of
twenty-four-hour cable news during the same period, the American
public was literally saturated throughout the 1990s with images of
4. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
109–12 (2008) [hereinafter SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING] (arguing that juvenile gang
members were at the center of a moral panic during the 1990s that produced draconian
laws such as California’s Proposition 21); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807 (2003) [hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth] (ar-
guing that the punitive trend in juvenile justice policy has elements of “moral panic, in
which the media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other in an escalating pattern
of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat”); see also STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND
MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS 9–10 (1972) (examining the
Mods and Rockers phenomenon in 1960s Britain “to illustrate some of the more intrinsic
features in the emergence of such collective episodes of juvenile deviance and the moral
panics they both generate and rely upon for their growth”).
5. For purposes of this Article, the term “news media” refers to both print media,
including newspapers and magazines, and broadcast media, including network television
news, local television news, cable news, and radio news.  It does not encompass digital,
computerized, or networked media, which are commonly referred to as “new media.”
6. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death
Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 597 (2004) (“It is well established that the media pre-
sent distorted images of crime and justice.”).
7. Eugenics, a theory grounded in the idea that criminal behavior is genetically deter-
mined, was influential in the formation of Progressive policies toward juveniles in the early
twentieth century. LAURA L. FINLEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE 41 (2007).
8. See Michael Welch et al., Youth Violence and Race in the Media: The Emergence of “Wild-
ing” as an Invention of the Press, 11 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 36, 37–39 (2004).
9. See infra note 10; see also infra Part II.B. R
10. The term “superpredator” was coined in 1995 by then Princeton Political Science
Professor John DiIulio. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STAN-
DARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23.
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juveniles of color taking the ubiquitous “perp walk.”  This Article re-
fers to the aggregate content and features of this narrative as the
“superpredator discourse.”
In important respects, the superpredator discourse distorted real-
ity.  The most obvious distortion was the implicit and, at times, explicit
suggestion by the media that adolescent crime rates were increasing at
a time when in fact they were dropping by unprecedented amounts.11
While violent crime rates among juveniles mushroomed in the late
1980s and early 1990s,12 they began to fall precipitously in the mid-
1990s.13  Nonetheless, media coverage of violent juvenile crime con-
tinued to increase.  The second and perhaps most pernicious distor-
tion was the media’s tendency to overemphasize the link between race
and violent crime.  Several studies conducted during the 1990s con-
cluded that both adults and juveniles of color were overrepresented as
perpetrators and underrepresented as victims in media crime sto-
ries.14  In reality, most of the crimes committed during the 1990s were
neither violent nor committed by minorities—they were property
crimes carried out by white offenders.15
By the early twenty-first century, the superpredator discourse had
receded, but by then, the juvenile justice system had been irrevocably
altered.  During the mid-1990s, even as juvenile crime rates dropped
by record rates, crime news coverage skyrocketed,16 and the American
11. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. R
12. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 201 (1999) (noting that the juvenile arrest rate for all violent crimes increased
67.3% between 1986 and 1995).
13. See MARK SOLER, PUBLIC OPINION ON YOUTH, CRIME AND RACE: A GUIDE FOR ADVO-
CATES 5 (2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/advocacyguide.pdf (explaining
that “despite a 68% decline in youth homicides from 1993 to 1999, 62% of poll respon-
dents in 1999 believed youth crime was up”).
14. LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE
NEWS 13 (2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.pdf (citing to six
of seven studies conducted during the 1990s that found that the news media under-
represented minorities as victims of crime, and nine of twelve studies conducted predomi-
nantly during the 1990s that found that the media overrepresented minorities as
perpetrators of crime).
15. Feld, supra note 2, at 1530–31 (“The nearly exclusive focus on violent crime cover- R
age distorts the actual distribution of serious criminal behavior in the real world because
most crimes are property crimes committed by white offenders.” (citing Franklin D. Gil-
liam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing
Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 562 (2000); Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Crime in Black and
White: The Violent, Scary World of Local News, 1 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS-POL. 15 (1996))).
16. Between 1990 and 1998, for example, violent crime rates fell by twenty percent, but
network television news coverage of violent crime increased by eighty-three percent; dur-
ing the same period, homicide rates fell by over thirty percent while coverage of homicides
increased by a staggering 473%.  DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 10; see also Feld, R
supra note 2, at 1530 (citing the same data). R
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public became gripped by fear that offending was out of control.17
Predictably, politicians were paying attention.  Between 1992 and
1997, nearly every state in the country passed legislation that made it
easier to prosecute juveniles as adults in criminal court in what legal
scholar Franklin Zimring called the “most sustained legislative crack-
down ever on serious offenses committed by youth within the jurisdic-
tional ages of American Juvenile Courts.”18  Under these so-called “get
tough” laws, juveniles were not only saddled with adult sentences, but
were also confined in record numbers in adult facilities.19  The raw
numbers were stark.  In 1988, approximately 1600 juvenile offenders
were confined in this country’s adult jails; by 1997, there were more
than 9000.20
These policies had particularly severe consequences for youth of
color.  While it had been the case for decades that racial and ethnic
minorities were more likely to be arrested, detained, formally charged
in juvenile court, transferred to adult court, and confined to secure
residential facilities than their white counterparts,21 these disparities
soared during the late 1980s and 1990s.  By 1997, African-Americans
constituted about fifteen percent of youth under the age of eighteen
in the nation, but nearly one-half of them were transferred to adult
court22—a disparity for which crime commission rates could not begin
to account.  Through sophisticated multi-regression analyses, numer-
ous studies conducted during the 1980s and 1990s identified statisti-
cally significant “race effects” on decisionmaking at multiple points in
the system.23  Social scientists concluded that it was not just that mi-
17. Jeffrey D. Alderman, Leading the Public: The Media’s Focus on Crime Shaped Sentiment,
PUB. PERSP., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 26, 26–27 & fig.1 (describing the increase in public con-
cern about crime in the mid-1990s).
18. Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological
Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
19. See infra text accompanying note 20. R
20. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS 5 tbl.2 (2000).
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. Building Blocks for Youth, Fact Sheet: Punitive Policies Hit Youth of Color Hardest,
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/dmc/facts_yoc.html (last visited May 24,
2010).
23. “[R]ace effect means that minority status . . . has an impact on what happens to
youth as they are processed through the juvenile justice system.” CARL E. POPE ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DISPROPORTION-
ATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH
2001 10 n.1 (2002) [hereinafter DMC: 1989–2001 REVIEW OF LITERATURE]; see also Michael
J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal
Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 11–14, 40 (2002) (noting that most of the
studies being examined “found evidence of race differences in juvenile justice outcomes
that [we]re not totally accounted for by differential involvement in crime” and defining
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norities were committing a disproportionate number of offenses, but
there was reason to believe that race bias might be infecting outcomes
for juveniles of color.24
This Article will claim that the ascendance of the superpredator
discourse may have contributed to the presence of racial bias in the
administration of juvenile justice during the postmodern era.25  While
the news media’s influence on the political, penal, and legal orienta-
tion of the criminal and juvenile justice systems has been increasingly
well documented,26 its role in shaping the mental processes of those
who administer the law has not.  I will suggest that the superpredator
discourse amplified the racial biases of juvenile court “insiders”27 in at
least two distinct ways.  First, it likely fostered a “motivational bias” to
apply the law, and in particular the “get tough” laws, more rigidly to
youth of color.28  This theory is based on the notion that most insiders
are, to a large extent, political actors whose longevity depends on pub-
lic support.29  Thus, as long as the general public was convinced that
minority offenders were inherently more deviant and predatory than
white offenders—and by some accounts, this was true well into the
“race effect” as “the presence of a statistically significant race relationship with a case out-
come that remains once controls for legal factors have been considered”); Belinda R. Mc-
Carthy & Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process:
The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 41, 58–60 (1986) (noting that as cases progress, race and class directly affect
dispositions, with minority youth receiving harsher sentences).
24. See infra notes 31, 43 and accompanying text. R
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See, e.g., FOX ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–17 (introducing the idea that “tabloid justice R
stories” published by the media sometimes emphasize troubling aspects of the justice sys-
tem, but “most important[ly],” the stories “have played a substantial role not only in expos-
ing a new and irresponsible era of journalistic standards but also in undermining public
faith in the justice system”); Beale, supra note 2, at 421–71 (asserting that sensationalist R
coverage of violent crime in the media has increased, contributing to greater levels of fear
of crime and amplified support for harsher punishment); Feld, supra note 2, at 1527 (argu- R
ing that news media coverage of violent crime overemphasized race and violence in such a
way that it encouraged tougher policies toward criminals); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, supra note 4, at 807–08 (describing the facilitative role that news media has played in R
fueling public fears about youth crime); see also Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race
and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 710 (2002)
(“Sensationalized media accounts of inner-city violence played against this backdrop of a
real and troubling increase in juvenile homicide to create an exaggerated threat to public
safety.”).
27. For purposes of this Article, the term “insiders” refers to those actors within the
juvenile court whose decisions determine whether and/or how an individual juvenile will
be processed.  They generally include juvenile court judges, clerk magistrates, prosecutors,
probation officers, and intake officers.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra notes 30, 39 and accompanying text. R
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twenty-first century—insiders had a political incentive to “get tough”
on youth of color.30
Second, the superpredator discourse may have amplified insid-
ers’ implicit racial biases.  Building on Professor Jerry Kang’s Trojan
Horse theory, which likens the process through which racially and
criminally explicit news programming infiltrates the human psyche
with a corruptive computer virus,31 I will suggest that the graphic and
racialized nature of the superpredator discourse likely sparked an im-
perceptible cognitive reaction within the minds of those insiders
whose job it was to make day-to-day decisions inside the juvenile
court.32  Unbeknownst to those who were exposed to the super-
predator discourse, at the same time that they were obtaining what
they consciously believed to be objective facts about incidents of juve-
nile crime, they were unwittingly taking in subliminal messages that
juveniles of color were incarcerated in disproportionate numbers not
because the juvenile justice system was infirm, but because juveniles of
color were inherently more deviant than their white counterparts.33
In turn, insiders developed unconscious “attributional” biases regard-
ing minority offenders.34
Admittedly, these theories are weakened by the inherent diffi-
culty of proving causation.35  After all, insiders are unlikely to admit or
30. See Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (criticizing prosecutors who “keep
personal tallies . . . for self-promotion”); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accounta-
bility and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004)
(finding that judges became more punitive the closer they came to reelection).
31. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1553–54 (“A type of computer virus, a Trojan Horse R
installs itself on a user’s computer without her awareness. . . .  Here is the translation to the
news context: we turn on the television in search of local news, and with that information
comes a Trojan Horse that alters our racial schemas.”).
32. See infra Part IV.B.2.
33. See infra Part IV.B.
34. See, e.g., George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 567
(1998) (concluding that probation officers’ written rationales for sentencing recommenda-
tions indicated that they were more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of minority
youth to internal forces, such as personal failure, inadequate moral character, and person-
ality, and the criminal behavior of white youth to external forces, such as environment,
even when the objective risk factors associated with the youth were similar); Sandra Gra-
ham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 (2004) (documenting the impact of written racial cues on police
and probation officers’ judgments about the “culpability,” “likely recidivism,” and “de-
served punishment” of hypothetical offenders).
35. While several laboratory studies have documented the impact of media-generated
cues on subsequent perception and behavior, this research is often hampered by its inabil-
ity to control for other forms of stimuli to which a subject may have been exposed and the
lack of real world conditions associated with routine media consumption. See Beale, supra
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even realize they are biased,36 let alone that the media was a source.
But consider the wealth of interdisciplinary evidence produced over
the last two decades.  Legal scholars and political scientists have re-
peatedly linked the media’s coverage of juvenile crime with the public
and political outcry for a more punitive juvenile justice system.37  So-
cial cognition research, in turn, has demonstrated that deci-
sionmakers who are motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion
show bias toward directional outcomes that support that conclusion,38
and that this bias is particularly acute when elected actors (that is,
insiders) are actively motivated by political concerns.39  In the social
cognition context, psychologists have shown that implicit bias is intrin-
sic to the human brain40 and is both exacerbated and activated
through exposure to the racial language and imagery embedded in
media crime coverage, like the superpredator discourse.41  While it is
logical to infer that racialized messages about juvenile offenders
might be less likely to interfere with the information processing of
note 2, at 466 (observing that studies of media effects on subsequent displays of racial bias R
“present no evidence that the news media constitute the original—or even the most impor-
tant—source of the prejudices and stereotypes” observed).
36. See infra notes 235, 274 and accompanying text. R
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. R
38. See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 180 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,
482–88 (1990) (citing an example of reasoning driven by directional goals in which stu-
dents who want to believe that they will achieve academic success may recall their prior
academic successes with more frequency than their academic failures).
39. See, e.g., Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: Cultural, Political,
and Procedural Dynamics in California Juvenile Justice, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 387, 418 (2007)
(arguing that the desire among certain California juvenile court prosecutors to “project[ ]
an image that they are holding youth accountable to their offenses and that ‘justice’ is
being served[ ] determined what would happen in the courtroom”); Huber & Gordon,
supra note 30, at 248 (arguing that “[t]rial judges will become more punitive as their terms R
proceed”).
40. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1256–57 (2002) (citing neuroscience as supporting the proposition
that “basic cognitive mechanisms . . . predispose us toward stereotypes”); Allen J. Hart et
al., Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs. Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11
NEUROREPORT 2351 (2000) (describing differing responses in the human amygdala to
images of one’s own racial group and other racial groups); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995) (linking social cognition theory to dis-
crimination); see also Kevin N. Ochsner & Matthew D. Lieberman, The Emergence of Social
Cognitive Neuroscience, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 717, 720 (2001) (explaining that “[s]tereotypes
are cognitive structures” that influence expectations and beliefs, which in turn “biases per-
son perception processes”).
41. See Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 15, at 563–67 (describing experiments to assess R
the effect of crime news).  The racial priming effect is so powerful that sixty percent of the
participants in a “crime script” video experiment that did not include a perpetrator recal-
led seeing one, and of those, seventy percent recalled seeing an African-American perpe-
trator. Id. at 564.
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juvenile court insiders by virtue of both their professional training42
and the likelihood that their “direct” experiences with minority of-
fenders would outweigh their mediated experiences, recent studies
have confirmed that subliminal racial cues can amplify and trigger un-
conscious bias and stereotyping by juvenile court insiders.43  Finally,
multiple scholars have observed that the lax conditions within which
decisions are made in the juvenile court allow racial biases to flour-
ish.44  While none of this constitutes proof of a connection between
mediated crime discourse, racial bias, and disparate treatment, I will
suggest that it should, at the very least, prompt us to take a closer look.
Part II of this Article will explore the American news media’s
treatment of juvenile offending and justice over the last two decades.
It focuses in particular on the superpredator discourse—the icono-
graphic caricature of juvenile offenders that gained traction in the
1990s even as violent crimes rates among juveniles were dropping
precipitously.45  Part III will then examine what has happened within
the juvenile justice system during the same period.  After a brief
description of the history and purpose of the juvenile court, I will doc-
ument the increasingly sophisticated evidence of one of the juvenile
justice system’s most troubling features—the presence of dispropor-
tionate minority contact.46
Part IV will consider the intersections between the phenomena
described in Parts II and III.  Drawing upon recent social science stud-
42. Generalized research shows that subliminal racial cues are less likely to interfere
with performance and judgment when the subject has been trained for the task at hand.
See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Poten-
tially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1326 (2002) (sug-
gesting that training participants to distinguish guns from cell phones may reduce
“Shooter Bias”).
43. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 34, at 487 (documenting the impact of written R
racial cues on police officers’ and juvenile probation officers’ judgments about the “culpa-
bility, expected recidivism, and deserved punishment” of hypothetical offenders); cf.
Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590–91 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors exhibit cognitive
bias); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004) (finding that capital defense attorneys ex-
hibit the same levels of implicit bias as the rest of the population); Chris Guthrie et al.,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (reporting on a study of 167
federal magistrate judges, which revealed that they are susceptible to heuristics and biases
when making decisions); Michael J. Leiber & Kristan C. Fox, Race and the Impact of Detention
on Juvenile Justice Decision Making, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 470, 489–90 (2005) (attributing ob-
served negative race effects in outcomes to “racial stereotyping of African Americans as
delinquent, prone to drug offenses, dangerous, and unsuitable for treatment”).
44. See infra Part III.B.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part III.
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ies of causes, functions, and consequences of motivational and im-
plicit biases, I will claim that exposure to the superpredator discourse
may have had a discernable impact on the motives, attitudes, and be-
haviors of those whose job it was to administer justice within the juve-
nile court.
Part V will explain why this analysis is both timely and significant.
First, it is self-evident that any link among mediated discourse, racial
bias, and disparate treatment is normatively undesirable and worthy of
attention.  In this regard, the most obvious target may be the media.
While Professor Jerry Kang and others have suggested that the govern-
ment may have a role to play through the regulation of broadcast me-
dia,47 a less controversial approach might be through what cultural
criminologists call “replacement discourse,” a counter-narrative, a` la
the “Jena 6” storyline,48 whose purpose is to neutralize episodic crime
coverage through the promotion of thematic alternatives.49  A num-
ber of institutional interventions are also promising.  In both public
and private settings, “debiasing” protocols aimed at enhancing inter-
nal and external decisionmaking accountability, reliance on objective
classification instruments, and cultural competency education have
proven successful in minimizing bias.50
This analysis also has implications for the broader struggle to re-
duce systemic disparities and their attendant academic debates.  Here,
too, the juvenile justice system provides context.  Remarkably, during
precisely the same era that the superpredator craze was in full swing
and racial disproportionality was swelling, the federal government was
actively engaged in a national initiative to reduce it.51  In 1988, Con-
gress amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
(“JJDPA”) to require every state receiving certain forms of juvenile jus-
tice funding to investigate and take steps to remedy the problem of
disproportionate minority contact (“DMC”) in its secure facilities.52
47. Kang, supra note 2, at 1571–72. R
48. See infra note 347 and accompanying text. R
49. See infra Part V.B.
50. See infra Part V.A.
51. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. R
52. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7258(c), 102 Stat. 4434, 4440 (1988) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)).  Under the JJDPA, the acronym “DMC” originally re-
ferred to “Disproportionate Minority Confinement,” which occurs when the percentage of
minority youth confined in juvenile justice system facilities exceeds their proportion in the
general population.  See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
415, § 223(a), 88 Stat. 1109, 1119–22 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5633(a)(22) (2006)) (requiring that states provide plans that are designed to reduce the
disproportionate number of minorities in the juvenile justice system).  In 2002, Congress
expanded the concept of DMC to include any point of “contact” with the juvenile justice
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Over the last twenty years, hundreds of millions of federal dollars have
been filtered to the states, several prominent foundations have joined
the cause, municipal commissions have been formed, technical assis-
tance manuals and websites have been created, and dozens of initia-
tives have been launched to make up what has been called a “multi-
million dollar cottage industry” dedicated to achieving racial equity in
this country’s juvenile courts.53  Yet, however promising on paper,54
the “DMC Mandate” has been mostly ineffectual in practice, and dis-
parities have generally remained stagnant.55
While blame for the DMC Mandate’s failure defies consensus,
what has become clear is that in the majority of states, juvenile court
insiders have yet to embrace and implement proven remedies.56  Cur-
rently pending before the U.S. Senate is Senate Bill 678, the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2008, a
bill that aims to strengthen the provisions of the DMC Mandate by
providing more explicit and stringent guidance to states.57  What the
legislation does not address, however, are the sources of this en-
trenched and attenuated insider intransigence.  I will suggest that just
as the superpredator discourse and the political firestorm that fol-
lowed contributed to racial disproportionality, the discourse may also
have played a role in subverting, or at the very least neutralizing, the
aims of its federally mandated cure.  While some of this resistance is
undoubtedly the product of insiders’ natural tendencies to legitima-
system at which minority youth are overrepresented. See Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§ 12209(1)(P), 116 Stat. 1873, 1878 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5633(a)(22) (2006)) (specifying that states should submit plans to reduce the number of
minority juveniles who “come into contact with the juvenile justice system”).  The acronym
“DMC” now commonly refers to “Disproportionate Minority Contact.”
53. See JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: REFLECTIONS
ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 15
(2008), http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20
Question.pdf (indicating that the “multi-million dollar cottage industry” of initiatives has
largely failed to produce any measurable results).
54. See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 378–79
(2007) (citing the provision as a potential model for regulatory responses to racial dispari-
ties in other realms of the public arena).
55. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NA-
TIONAL REPORT 163 (2006) (demonstrating that there has been little change in the racial
make-up of the delinquency case load); see also infra Part V.
56. See, e.g., ROBIN DAHLBERG, ACLU, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT IN
MASSACHUSETTS 1–2 (2003) (discussing Massachusetts’s continued failure to comply with
the DMC Mandate).
57. See S. 678, 111th Cong. §§ 205, 210, 271 (2009).
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tize and defend the status quo,58 this resistance can become nearly
insurmountable, I will suggest, during periods when the dominant
mediated discourse undermines the egalitarian messages on which
the reform effort is premised.59  While this proposition may seem self-
evident, neither it nor its normative implications have been explored
in any depth.
II. CONSTRUCTING A “SUPERPREDATOR”
Once reified as the “Fourth Estate” of government, the news me-
dia has long been regarded an indispensible element of Western soci-
ety.60  In its purest form, the news media is envisioned as a guardian of
the public interest, responsible for exposing abuses of power while
defending the democratic values of the populace.61  In a true free
market system such as ours, however, it is all but inevitable that less
noble pursuits would emerge.  In the early 1990s, the media began to
incorporate an “infotainment” approach to reporting.62  Nowhere was
this more apparent than in the news media’s coverage of crime and
58. See, e.g., Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1123–25 (2006) (arguing
that people “are motivated to accept and perpetuate features of existing social arrange-
ments, even if those features were arrived at accidentally, arbitrarily, or unjustly”).
59. See infra notes 366–67 and accompanying text.  Likewise, it can become far easier to R
remediate disparities when this discourse is consonant with reform.  We have seen this
most recently with globalized efforts to combat climate change.
60. See THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP, & THE HEROIC IN HISTORY
141 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1993) (1841).  Carlyle explained:
[T]here were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder,
there sat a Fourth Estate more important than they all . . . .  Whoever can speak,
speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government,
with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority.  It matters not what
rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the requisite thing is that he have a
tongue which others will listen to; this and nothing more is requisite.
Id. (attributing quote to Sir Edmund Burke).
61. See generally DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 3–4 (1959)
(“The good ones provide separate eyes and ears for their constituencies—a double check
on the Congressmen.  Unlike the Congressmen, they can carry even a picayune issue di-
rectly to the President with some hope of evoking a response.”); Walter H. Annenberg, The
Fourth Branch of the Government, in IMPACT OF MASS MEDIA: CURRENT ISSUES 290, 290–93 (Ray
Eldon Hiebert & Carol Reuss eds., 1985) (“[M]ost Americans agree that despite its ex-
cesses . . . the press has served us well through the years, [and] has been a constructive
factor in our growth and prosperity by keeping our citizenry informed.”).
62. Critics charge that both print and broadcast media adopted an “infotainment” ap-
proach to reporting during the 1990s, which emphasized celebrity and scandal and deem-
phasized policy and data. See, e.g., PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, CHANGING
DEFINITIONS OF NEWS 1 (1998), http://www.journalism.org/sites/journalism.org/files/
ChangingDefinitionsofNews.pdf (explaining that a two-part study of newspapers, nightly
news, and news magazines over a twenty-year span and prime time network news magazines
over a seven-week period in 1997 found that “[t]here ha[d] been a shift toward lifestyle,
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criminal justice.  The 1990s saw a decisive shift by both the print and
broadcast news media toward a “soft news”63 agenda that sensational-
ized and, in many ways, racialized crime stories.64  While sensational-
ism and scandal were not new to the news media,65 even against this
backdrop, several trends of the 1990s stood out.  The first was the ra-
pidity with which crime took center stage in the media in the early
1990s.  Between 1990 and 1993, for example, network news coverage
of crime tripled to an average of nearly five stories per broadcast, as
crime leapt from the fifth to the first most covered topic on the eve-
ning news.66  The second was the media’s seemingly insatiable thirst
for violent crime stories.  Coverage of homicides alone increased
more than five-fold by the end of the decade.67  The third was the
media’s obsession with high-profile criminal cases—the Menendez
brothers, JonBene´t Ramsey, and, of course, O.J. Simpson, among the
celebrity, entertainment and celebrity crime/scandal in the news and away from govern-
ment and foreign affairs”).
63. “Soft news” has been described as “news that is typically more sensational, more
personality-centered, less time-bound, more practical, and more incident-based than other
news.”  Thomas E. Patterson, Doing Well and Doing Good: How Soft News and Critical Journal-
ism Are Shrinking the News Audience and Weakening Democracy—And What News Outlets Can Do
About It 3–5 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP01-001, 2000), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/reports/soft_news_and_critical_jour-
nalism_2000.pdf.
64. This style of crime and criminal justice reporting has been labeled “tabloid justice,”
and is said to emerge through the convergence of a “legal proceeding presented largely as
entertainment, an obsessive media establishment, and an attentive public.” FOX ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 6–7; see also Beale, supra note 2, at 422 (noting that the “coverage of R
crime—particularly violent crime—has increased dramatically, and the nature of the cover-
age has shifted toward a tabloid style”).
65. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, for example, “yellow
journalism” regularly featured salacious crime stories as a diversion from policy-laden news.
See generally W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, YELLOW JOURNALISM: PUNCTURING THE MYTHS, DEFINING
THE LEGACIES 5–13 (2001) (describing the rise of “yellow journalism” beginning at the end
of the nineteenth century).
66. 1990—The Year in Review, MEDIA MONITOR, Jan. 1991, at 2–3 (reporting that net-
work evening news stories on crime aired 542 times; of these, stories on murder and homi-
cide statistics aired eighty-six times, while stories on the high-profile Marion Barry drug
arrest aired fifty-five times); 1993—The Year in Review, MEDIA MONITOR, Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 2
(reporting that network news stories on crime and drugs aired 1698 times; of these, 329
were stories on murder, which is triple the number of murder stories that aired in 1992).
For the decade as a whole, crime was by far the number one news topic. The Media at the
Millennium, MEDIA MONITOR, July–Aug. 2000, at 2–3 (reporting that during the 1990s, net-
work news programs produced 14,289 total crime stories—nearly 4000 more than the sec-
ond most covered topic, economy and business—and that “[s]ince 1993, when the
networks’ infatuation with crime began, crime has been the number one news topic four
out of seven years”).  By all accounts, local news coverage of crime was even more extreme.
See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that the “‘if it bleeds, it leads’ R
edict . . . seems to govern local TV news in particular”).
67. The Media at the Millennium, supra note 66, at 3–4. R
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most memorable.  Fourth was the emergence of the network news
magazines, such as ABC’s 20/20, CBS’s 48 Hours, and NBC’s Dateline,
which frequently devoted their entire programming hour to a single
criminal case.68  And finally, as I discuss below, the 1990s stood out for
the degree to which child offenders, once protected from public
scorn by law and practice, began to dominate crime news stories.
A. “Wilding”
Although juvenile crime rates had begun to rise several years ear-
lier,69 it was not until the infamous “Central Park Jogger” case in 1989
that the media began to coalesce around a juvenile crime narrative.70
The facts of the case are tragically familiar.  On April 19, 1989, a
young female jogger was brutally beaten, raped, and left to die in
Manhattan’s Central Park.71  Within hours, a group of seven Harlem
teens ranging in age from fourteen to sixteen were arrested and
charged with rape, assault, and attempted murder.72  All of the sus-
pects were African-American or Latino.  On April 22, 1989, three days
after the attack, the New York Times introduced a new term into the
crime lexicon:
The youths who raped and savagely beat a young invest-
ment banker as she jogged in Central Park Wednesday night
were part of a loosely organized gang of 32 schoolboys whose
random, motiveless assaults terrorized at least eight other
people over nearly two hours, senior police investigators said
yesterday.
Chief of Detectives Robert Colangelo, who said the at-
tacks appeared unrelated to money, race, drugs or alcohol,
68. FOX ET AL., supra note 2, at 84–86. R
69. “Between 1984 and 1994, the number of murders involving only juvenile offenders
increased by 150% . . . .” HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUVENILE CRIME 5 (2001),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/191031.pdf.  This increase has been attributed in
part to “[t]he deindustrialization of the urban core” during the 1970s and 1980s, which led
to massive job losses for urban minorities, “the introduction of crack cocaine into the inner
cities, and the proliferation of guns among youths.”  Feld, supra note 2, at 1454 n.18, R
1515–18.  It has also been linked more broadly to a cross-national surge in crime rates
during this period. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 90 (2001) (“Late modernity’s impact upon crime rates
was a multi-dimensional one that involved: (i) increased opportunities for crime, (ii) re-
duced situational controls, (iii) an increase in the population ‘at risk’, and (iv) a reduction
in the efficacy of social and self controls as a consequence of shifts in social ecology and
changing cultural norms.”).
70. See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. R
71. David Pitt, Jogger’s Attackers Terrorized at Least 9 in 2 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1989.
72. Id.
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said that some of the 20 youths brought in for questioning
had told investigators that the crime spree was the product of
a pastime called “wilding.”73
Immediately, journalists latched onto the story.74  In New York
City newspapers alone, the term “wilding” would appear 156 times in
articles over the next eight years.75  The national news media also
jumped into the fray.  A month after the assault, as the victim began to
recover, People magazine would dub the crime the “Night of the ‘Wild-
ing.’”76  The introduction and proliferation of the term “wilding” was
significant in several respects.  First, its racial connotations were un-
mistakable.  In every one of the 156 New York newspaper articles in
which the race of the perpetrator was mentioned in the text, the sus-
pects were identified as either African-American or Latino males; con-
versely, with the exception of a single incident, each of the victims was
described as a white female.77  By contrast, when, four months after
the Central Park Jogger attack, thirty white teenagers from Ben-
sonhurst, Brooklyn, cornered a sixteen-year-old African-American boy
in a parking lot and shot him to death, they were referred to in the
press as “white young men” or a “gang of thirty white teens.”78
Second, the “wilding” meme purported to brand a “new breed” of
child offenders, who committed vicious and motiveless crimes for the
sheer pleasure of doing so.79  A survey of the 406 print and television
73. Id.
74. In many respects, the underlying facts of the case lent themselves to a “literary”
narrative:
First and foremost, the attack occurred in New York City’s Central Park, a city and
a public space that have been mythologized with a legendary reputation for pred-
atory violence.  Secondly, the victim was a white female whose physical attributes,
social status, and personal biography were injected into virtually every media ac-
count.  She was described as young, beautiful, and educated as well as a Manhat-
tan investment banker . . . .  Likewise, her personal and physical attributes
indicated further a strong moral character: As a jogger, she exemplified the so-
cially admired trait of taking care of one’s health while extolling the virtues of
athleticism.  It has been said that tragedy cannot emerge without greatness.  In
case [sic] of the Central Park jogger, her persona, projected by the media, serves
as a significant subtext magnifying the horrific nature of the crime and her strug-
gle to survive.
Welch et al., supra note 8, at 39. R
75. Id. at 42.
76. PEOPLE WKLY., May 22, 1989.
77. See Welch et al., supra note 8, at 45. R
78. Lynell Hancock, Wolf Pack: The Press and the Central Park Jogger, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2003, at 38, 42.
79. The media’s invention of “new forms of menace” was not a new practice:
While drawing on racial stereotypes in reporting incidents of crime, the media
also resorts to sensationalism whereby so-called new forms of menace are in-
vented and commodified for public consumption.  The media, for example, has
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news stories that appeared in the fifteen days after the story broke, for
example, found that “[t]he crime was most often presented as a ran-
dom act, a product of subculture of ‘wild youth.’”80  “The story was
like a centrifuge,” a former New York Newsday columnist would later
remark.  “Everyone was pinned into a position—the press, the police,
the prosecution—and no one could press the stop button.”81
The postscript to the Central Park Jogger case is, of course, essen-
tial.  Based solely on their purported confessions, three of the
juveniles were convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree assault
and sentenced to five to ten years in prison; a fourth was convicted of
attempted murder and rape and sentenced to five to ten years; a fifth
was convicted of assault, riot, and sexual abuse and sentenced to eight-
and-a-half to twenty-six years; a sixth pled guilty to an unrelated rob-
bery; and charges against the seventh were dropped.82  In 2002, thir-
teen years after their convictions, a convicted rapist named Matias
Reyes confessed to the crime.83  DNA testing subsequently matched
Reyes’s DNA to DNA recovered from the victim, and the six juveniles
were acquitted—but not before they had spent the remaining years of
their adolescence in prison.84
B. “Stone Cold Predators” and “Crime Tsunamis”
“Wilding” set the stage for what might be the most infamous char-
acterization of juveniles in history.  In 1995, in an article entitled The
Coming of the Super-Predators, former Princeton University Political Sci-
ence Professor John DiIulio warned of an oncoming tsunami of ado-
lescent “super-predators”—“morally impoverished” youth who had
grown up “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in
abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings.”85
These were “kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and
no sense of the future” and who are “‘stone-cold predators.’”86  DiIu-
lio projected that the juvenile population would only continue to in-
played a key role in the social construction of mugging, crack babies, crank (i.e.,
methamphetamine or “speed”), drive-by shootings, superpredators, and serial
killers.
See Welch et al., supra note 8, at 37 (citations omitted). R
80. TIMOTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS 57 (No-
table Trials Library 1994) (1992).
81. Id.
82. Welch et al., supra note 8, at 40. R
83. Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions—Lessons of the Central Park Jogger
Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 220 (2006).
84. Id.
85. DiIulio, supra note 10, at 25–26. R
86. Id. at 23–24.
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crease.87  The news media ran with this narrative. “Superpredators”
Arrive, announced Newsweek in January 1996, with a question: Should
We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids?88  “They are not here yet,” warned
the Tampa Tribune four months later, “but they are predicted to be a
plague upon the United States in the next decade.  They are not some
creatures from outer space; they are our own children.”89
The typical superpredator script had three predominant ele-
ments: violence, depravity, and cast.  First, juvenile offenders were vio-
lent: They were “gangbangers,” “carjackers,” “hardcores,” “street
thugs,” “monsters,” “hoods,” “juvies” and, of course, “super-
predators.”90  While the news media has always gravitated toward vio-
lent crime stories,91 this was taken to a new level in the 1990s.
Between 1993 and 1997, three separate studies concluded that homi-
cides made up more than a quarter of all crimes reported on the eve-
ning news—at a rate of 100 to 300 times their actual occurrences.92  A
2000 study of local evening newscasts in six major United States cities
found that when children appeared in crime news stories, it was in the
context of violent crime eighty-four percent of the time.93  Consider
some of the cover stories from popular news magazines during the
1990s: Newsweek, March 9, 1992: Kids and Guns: A Report from America’s
Classroom Killing Grounds; Time, August 2, 1993: Big Shots: An Inside
Look at the Deadly Love Affair Between America’s Kids and Their Guns; News-
87. See WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT:
MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996)
(charting the projected increase in the United States juvenile population between 1990
and 2010).
88. Peter Annin, “Superpredators” Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids?,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57.
89. Editorial, Heading Off the “Superpredators,” TAMPA TRIB., May 21, 1996, at 8.
90. See, e.g., Advice to Waterpark Managers: Take Strong Stance Against Gangs, AMUSEMENT
BUS., Nov. 8, 1993, at 50 (“hardcores”); Editorial, Cracking Down on CHA Violence, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 20, 1997, at 22 (“gangbangers”); Annin, supra note 88, at 57 (“superpredators”); R
Denney Clements, Saving Kids from Crime, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 9, 1997, at 13A (“mon-
sters”); Kevin Diaz, 20 of Cars Stolen in City Are Not Found, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL), Apr. 22, 1986, at B1 (“hoods”); Christopher Heredia, Contra Costa Dilemma—Deten-
tion v. Prevention: Report Critical of County Approach to At-Risk Kids, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14,
1997, at A23 (“carjackers”); Mark Johnson, Purge of Gun Dealers Working Clinton Crusade Cuts
Tally 56% to 124,286 as Small-Timers Lose, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 1997, at A2
(“street thugs”); Victoria Slind-Flor, Pressure to Give Juries to Juvies Tried as Adults, NAT’L L.J.,
Oct. 6, 1997, at A6 (“juvies”).
91. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
92. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 8–9. R
93. CHILDREN NOW, THE LOCAL TELEVISION NEWS MEDIA’S PICTURE OF CHILDREN 7, 16
(2001), http://www.childrennow.org/uploads/documents/local_television_2001.pdf (ex-
amining local hour-long evening newscasts in Atlanta, Boston, Des Moines, Los Angeles,
New York, and Seattle for CBS, NBC, and ABC affiliates between July 1 and July 31, 2000).
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week, August 2, 1993: Teen Violence: Wild in the Streets; U.S. News & World
Report, November 8, 1993: Guns in the Schools: When Killers Come to
Class—Even Suburban Parents Now Fear the Rising Tide of Violence; and
U.S. News & World Report, March 25, 1996: Teenage Time Bombs: Violent
Juvenile Crime Is Soaring—and It Is Going to Get Worse.94
The second predominant element of the superpredator script
was the notion that this new breed of juvenile offenders was morally
depraved.95  This message was sometimes explicit—Kids Without a Con-
science? asked the cover of People magazine in June 199796—but more
often implicit.  In its coverage of juvenile offending, the news media
overwhelmingly relied on a technique called “episodic” framing—in-
stead of placing an individual incident in its broader statistical, politi-
cal, or socioeconomic context, the news media frequently reported
juvenile offenses as discrete events.97  Political scientists Professors
Franklin Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar cite the following sample from a
Los Angeles Channel 9 (KCAL) newscast as typical of an episodic
crime news script:
Anchor’s introduction: “A man was shot this afternoon in broad
daylight while sitting in his jeep.”
Crime Scene Coverage: pictures of jeep and cordoned-off street;
concerned neighbor comments (“Imagine something like
this happening just in front of your house; I mean, it’s really
scary.”)
Apprehension of suspect: “Police are looking for this man last
seen driving away in a blue Honda Accord (picture of sus-
pect on screen).  Police believe the suspect may have argued
with the victim before he was shot.”98
This entire segment was presented in a little over a minute, Gil-
liam and Iyengar note.99  According to social scientists, this type of
94. See Robert E. Shepherd, How the Media Misrepresents Juvenile Policies, CRIM. JUST.,
Winter 1998, at 37, 38 (listing cover stories in national magazines that have “heightened
the emphasis on youth crime”).
95. See infra notes 100, 124, 138–41 and accompanying text. R
96. PEOPLE WKLY., June 23, 1997.
97. See CHILDREN NOW, supra note 93, at 5, 16 (finding that eighty-one percent of sto- R
ries featured on locally produced evening news programs on the three major networks in
six American cities between July 1 and July 31, 2000, “made no connection between dis-
crete events (e.g. criminal incidents) and broader trends or themes (e.g. U.S. poverty rates
or after school programs)”); DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 7, 12 (observing that R
“[s]tudies spanning almost 100 years—1910 to 2000—are consistent in their findings that
news reports describe what happened with little reporting about why the crime and vio-
lence happened or what could be done about it”).
98. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 15, at 561. R
99. Id.
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framing encourages viewers to associate the conduct in question with
the moral deficiency of the individual, rather than her underlying so-
cial milieu,100 and, in the context of crime, galvanizes support for
more punitive crime policies.101  Episodic framing was a staple of chil-
dren’s news stories in the 1990s.  For example, a 1999 study of local
evening news programming in Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, Seattle,
and Columbia, South Carolina, found that ninety-four percent of sto-
ries on youth were presented in an episodic style.102  A similar study of
local evening newscasts in six major metropolitan areas conducted a
year later found that eighty-one percent of stories in which children
were the primary subject made no connection between discrete
events, such as crimes, and broader themes, such as poverty.103
Third, like its adult counterpart, the standard superpredator
script almost always had a “cast”—primarily in the form of a perpetra-
tor and victim.  More often than not, the perpetrators were portrayed
as black or brown and the victims as white.104  A 1999 study of youth
100. See, e.g., ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE
MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 49 (2001) (arguing that framing an incident, such as a
drive-by shooting, as a “gang war story” may obscure “other possible mental associations”
and may “make[ ] . . . more sympathetic connections less available to the audience”). See
generally SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?: HOW TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL IS-
SUES 5 (1991) (asserting that because framing focuses on “specific episodes, individual per-
petrators, victims, or other actors at the expense of more general, thematic information,”
viewers are less likely to attribute responsibility to societal factors).
101. See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for Political Issues, 546 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 59, 64–65 (1996) (noting that thirty-six percent of participants
surveyed after viewing an experimental episodic news story assigned individualistic rather
than societal responsibility to the perpetrator of the crime and sixty percent called for
more punitive crime policies); cf. Paul M. Kellstedt, Media Framing and the Dynamics of Racial
Policy Preferences, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 249–50 (2000) (noting that media coverage of race
frequently shifts between emphasizing one of two core American values—individualism
and egalitarianism—and arguing that when media coverage disproportionately emphasizes
the value of individualism, the public is more likely to express conservative policy
preferences).
102. What’s the Matter with Kids Today?: Images of Teenagers on Local and National TV News,
MEDIA MONITOR, Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 1–2.
103. CHILDREN NOW, supra note 93, at 5, 16. R
104. See Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 15, at 562 & nn.3–4.  The link between crime news R
and racial imagery is well established. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted); see also DORIS A.
GRABER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR AND POLITICS 154–56  (1976) (detailing the effect of mass media
on racial stereotyping); Robert M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism, and
Cultural Change, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 341 (1992); Robert M. Entman, Modern Racism and the
Images of Blacks in Local Television News, 7 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 332, 335–36 (1990)
(compiling data from Chicago newscasts featuring African-Americans); Gilliam et al., supra
note 15, at 7–8 (noting the tendency of news coverage to link race and violent crime); Jon R
Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Crime and Race: The Role of Racial Stereotypes, 41
AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 376 (1997) (same); Mark Peffley et al., The Intersection of Race and Crime
in Television News Stories: An Experimental Study, 13 POL. COMM. 309 (1996) (same); D.
Romer et al., The Treatment of Persons of Color in Local Television News: Ethnic Blame Discourse or
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stories broadcast on four national and fifteen local news programs
across the country, for example, found that youth of color appeared
in crime news far more often than white youth—fifty-two percent and
thirty-five percent, respectively.105  Conversely, white youth appeared
more often in health and education stories than youth of color—thir-
teen percent to two percent, respectively.106  Again, Professor DiIulio
was an avid participant in this dialogue.  In a 1996 article entitled My
Black Crime Problem, and Ours, Professor DiIulio wrote:
The second reason to keep the champagne corked is that
not only is the number of young black criminals likely to
surge, but also the black crime rate, both black-on-black and
black-on-white, is increasing, so that as many as half of these
juvenile super-predators could be young black males.107
C. Media Myths
In several important respects, the superpredator discourse dis-
torted reality.  The first was its overemphasis of violent crime.  Even as
Professor DiIulio and others were publishing their dire forecasts, na-
tional crime rates had begun to plummet.108  After spiking in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the 1990s as a decade saw the “largest decline
in violent crime rates in more than half a century.”109  News coverage
of violent crime, however, continued to explode.  A study by the
Center for Media and Public Affairs revealed that even though the
national homicide rate fell more than forty percent between 1990 and
1999, media coverage of murders increased more than seven-fold dur-
ing this period.110  Juvenile crime coverage was no exception.  While
violent crime rates among juveniles rose sharply between 1986 and
Realistic Group Conflict?, 25 COMM. RES. 286 (1998) (surveying similar data from Philadel-
phia news stations); Scot Worthy et al., Just Des(s)erts?: The Racial Polarization of Perceptions of
Criminal Injustice, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 637, 649–50, 654 (1997) (analyzing this trend gener-
ally and in the context of a single news story).
105. What’s the Matter with Kids Today?, supra note 102 (reporting results of a study of R
youth stories shown in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Columbia, South Caro-
lina, by ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and the network affiliates from September 29–October 24
and November 28–December 5, 1999).
106. Id.
107. John D. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, at 19.
108. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
109. Gary LaFree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
269, 269 (2000); see also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA
2 (2000) (noting the decline in violent crime in the 1990s); FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1999: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 15, 30 (2000) (noting that the murder and robbery
rates significantly dropped between 1995 and 1999).
110. The Media at the Millennium: The Networks’ Top Topics, Trends, and Joke Targets of the
1990s, MEDIA MONITOR, July–Aug. 2000, at 3.
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1995,111 they too began to drop by unprecedented amounts in the
mid-1990s.112  Between 1993 and 1999, youth homicide rates fell sixty-
eight percent.113  Nonetheless, the media was not deterred.  A study of
juvenile offending coverage by Hawaii’s major newspapers, the Hono-
lulu Star Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser, captured this dichotomy.
Between 1987 and 1996, the newspapers’ coverage of juvenile delin-
quency increased thirty-fold, and its coverage of gangs increased forty-
fold.114  Indeed, “ ‘gang activity’” constituted the most frequently cov-
ered juvenile crime topic.115  What is most remarkable about this cov-
erage is that, unlike the rest of the Nation, Hawaii’s juvenile crime
rates either declined or remained stagnant during that period.116
Second, in its effort to demonize superpredators, the news media
rarely provided either a cognitive or sociological perspective on the
causes of juvenile crime.117  For decades, developmental psychologists
had speculated that the inherent differences between the adolescent
brain and the adult brain accounted for higher levels of youthful of-
fending.118  This research came to a head in the 1990s when the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation sponsored a decade-long
project on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice (“ADJJ”),
which focused on developing a better understanding of adolescent
decisionmaking, adjudicative competence, and criminal culpability.119
ADJJ research confirmed what theorists had suspected: Juveniles pos-
sess what has been termed “immature judgment,” which impacts their
peer orientation, their risk perception, their temporal perspective,
and their capacity for self-management.120  Neuroscientific evidence
also began to emerge that these characteristics are organic: The por-
tions of the human brain that regulate long-term planning, impulse
control, regulation of emotion, and risk evaluation are simply not fully
111. FELD, supra note 12, at 201 (noting that the juvenile arrest rate for all violent crimes R
increased 67.3% between 1986 and 1995).
112. See SOLER, supra note 13, at 5 (providing statistics). R
113. Id.
114. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 18. R
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 95–23 and accompanying text. R
118. See infra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. R
119. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juve-
nile Justice, About the Network: Our Purpose, http://www.adjj.org/content/about_us.php
(last visited May 25, 2010).
120. Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 4, at 811–13 (2003).  Laurence Stein- R
berg is a director of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Net-
work on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. Id. at 809.
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formed until adulthood.121  This research led a number of legal schol-
ars to call for new approaches to evaluating adolescent decisionmak-
ing and punishment that took these psychosocial realities into
account.122  Even as evidence was mounting that juvenile offenders
lacked the criminal capacity of their adult counterparts,123 the news
media continued to portray juvenile offenders as blameworthy.124
The third distortion was the media’s tendency to overemphasize
the link between race and violent crime.  While it is indisputable that
juvenile homicide rates increased significantly between the 1980s and
early 1990s,125 and that adults of color accounted for a disproportion-
ate share of violent crime arrests in the mid-1990s,126 several subse-
quent studies concluded that both adults and juveniles of color were
overrepresented as perpetrators and underrepresented as victims in
media crime stories.127  A now famous study of Los Angeles local news
during the mid-1990s, for example, found that African-Americans
121. Id. at 816 (citing L. P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifes-
tations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417 (2000) (examining research on
animal and human brain maturation and concluding that, across species, the brain remod-
els during adolescence)).
122. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influ-
ences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1788 (1995) (calling for a “more
comprehensive approach” to evaluate adolescent decisionmaking because the current ap-
proach inadequately considers psychosocial factors that may impact an adolescent’s matur-
ity of judgment); Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 51–53, 61–63 (1997) (noting potential psychosocial differences between
adolescents and adults and suggesting ways in which the legal system could account for
these differences when punishing adolescents); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning
in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1610, 1647–51, 1657 (1992) (citing stud-
ies demonstrating that adolescents make decisions differently than adults and proposing a
framework for analyzing adolescent decisionmaking that focuses on adolescent judgment
factors as well as reasoning); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adoles-
cence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,
160 (1997) (contending that psychosocial developmental factors may “influence decision-
making by adolescents in ways that are relevant to competence to stand trial and criminal
responsibility”).
123. See, e.g., Scott & Grisso, supra note 122, at 172–73 (noting that evidence from devel- R
opmental psychology supports the conclusion that juvenile offenders are less culpable than
adults).
124. See, e.g., Brian Doherty, When Kids Kill: Blame Those Who Pull Trigger, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, May 31, 1998, at J1 (rejecting the contention that “‘all of us’” are responsible for
teenage violence and insisting that “the kids who commit these horrible acts . . . are to
blame”).
125. See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 84 (1999) (“[H]omicide rates among white
males in the 14–17 age group doubled [from 1984 to 1993] . . . while for black males, the
rate more than quadrupled . . . .”).
126. Id. at 127 (“[B]lack offending rates are considerably higher than for other groups,
accounting for 43 percent of these arrests in 1996.”).
127. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 13 (citing nineteen studies conducted dur- R
ing the 1990s and noting that six of seven studies found that the news media under-
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were twenty-two percent more likely to be shown by the media com-
mitting violent crime than nonviolent crime, while, in reality, they
were equally likely to be arrested for both violent crime and nonvio-
lent crime.128  White Americans, on the other hand, were thirty-one
percent more likely to be depicted committing a nonviolent crime
than a violent crime, when, in fact, they were just seven percent more
likely to be arrested for a nonviolent crime.129  If anything, the por-
trayal of minority juveniles was more exaggerated.  A 2000 study of
local newscasts in six major U.S. cities, for example, found that sixty-
two percent of the stories involving Latino youth were about murder
or attempted murder.130  To put this in perspective, in 1998, minority
youth accounted for only one quarter of all juvenile crime arrests and
less than half of all violent juvenile crime arrests.131  There is also evi-
dence that the news media overrepresented the incidence of interra-
cial crime.  For example, between 1990 and 1994, inter-ethnic
homicides in Los Angeles were likely to be reported by the Los Angeles
Times twenty-five percent more than intra-ethnic homicides.132
D. Believing the Hype
By all indications, the American public was listening.  Even as na-
tional crime rates continued to decline, a flurry of public opinion
polls conducted in the late 1990s revealed the American public’s fear
of violent juvenile offenders.133  In a 1997 Los Angeles Times poll, for
example, eighty percent of respondents stated that the media’s por-
trayal of violent crime had increased their personal fear of becoming
a crime victim.134  Not surprisingly, then, the public’s fear of juvenile
offenders reached a fever pitch in the mid-1990s—even as juvenile
represented minorities as victims of crime, and nine of the remaining twelve found that
the media overrepresented minorities as perpetrators of crime).
128. Gilliam et al., supra note 15, at 13 & fig.4. R
129. Id.
130. CHILDREN NOW, supra note 93, at 14, 16; see also Melissa Hickman Barlow, Race and R
the Problem of Crime in Time and Newsweek Cover Stories, 1946 to 1995, SOC. JUST., Summer
1998, at 149, 155–56, 177 (performing a qualitative analysis of all Time and Newsweek crime
cover stories between 1946 and 1995 and concluding that both publications began to
racialize crime and equate “young black males” to criminals in the 1960s (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 21 (referencing a study that R
found that youth of color were far more likely to appear in television crime news than
white youth).
131. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 7 (2000), http:/
/www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justiceforsome/jfs.pdf.
132. Susan B. Sorenson et al., News Media Coverage and the Epidemiology of Homicide, 88 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1510, 1512 (1998).
133. See infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. R
134. Greg Braxton, Ratings vs. Crime Rates, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at Metro 1.
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crime rates continued to fall precipitously.  For instance, although ju-
venile homicides declined by sixty-eight percent between 1993 and
1999, sixty-two percent of respondents in one 1999 poll believed that
juvenile crime rates were increasing.135  Polls also revealed that white
Americans substantially overestimated the likelihood of being victim-
ized by a person of color.  For example, nearly twice as many respon-
dents to a 1994 poll believed that they were more likely to be
victimized by a minority than a white perpetrator,136 when, in reality,
they were roughly three times more likely to be victimized by other
whites.137
The public was also growing increasingly concerned that its ado-
lescent population had lost its moral compass.  A 2001 report pub-
lished by the Frameworks Institute, which compiled information from
dozens of surveys on perceptions of youth, was particularly illuminat-
ing.  Among the findings reported were the following: In response to
a 1998 survey, only sixteen percent of Americans said that “ ‘young
people under the age of 30 share[d] most of their moral and ethical
values’”—a result that, the author noted, “puts young adults’ values
only above . . . welfare recipients . . . and rich people.”138  Asked in a
separate 1998 poll what comes to mind when they think of teens,
nearly three-quarters responded with negative descriptions, such as
“‘rude,’” “ ‘wild,’” or “‘irresponsible,’”139 and eighty-two percent of
adults responding to a 1998 poll felt that youth “do not have a[ ]
strong . . . sense of right and wrong”—up from forty-six percent in
1965 and thirty-four percent in 1952.140  Not surprisingly, poll respon-
135. SOLER, supra note 13, at 5. R
136. See, e.g., Walter L. Updegrave, You’re Safer Than You Think, MONEY, June 1994, at 114
(reporting that “49% of Americans believe that whites are preyed on more often by non-
white criminals . . . rather than by other whites (26%)”).
137. See id. (“[O]f the 5.1 million violent crimes with white victims in 1992, the perpetra-
tor was white 66% of the time and black only 21%.”); see also CALLIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993–1998 10
(2001), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvr98.pdf (“Sixty-six percent of white
victims and 76% of black victims were victimized by an offender of the same race,
1993–98 . . . .”).
138. MEG BOSTROM, FRAMEWORKS INST., THE 21ST CENTURY TEEN: PUBLIC PERCEPTION
AND TEEN REALITY 4, 33 (2001) http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/
youth_public_perceptions.pdf (citing WASH. POST ET AL., AMERICAN VALUES: 1998 NA-
TIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICANS ON VALUES 3 (1998), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/loader.
cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14655).
139. Id. at 4 (summarizing two national telephone polls conducted between December
1–8, 1998, one of 1005 adults—including 384 parents of children under 18, and another of
328 teenagers (citing PUBLIC AGENDA, KIDS THESE DAYS ’99 3, 10 (1999), http://www.public
agenda.org/files/pdf/kids_these_days_99.pdf)).
140. Id. at 6, 33 n.11–13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing the Shell Poll by
Hart Research, a national poll of 1277 adults conducted between March 16–20, 1999; a
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dents overwhelmingly endorsed punitive responses to juvenile offend-
ing.  In a 1995 poll, for example, eighty-seven percent of Americans
agreed that a juvenile charged with a serious violent crime should be
tried as an adult, seventy percent agreed that a juvenile who is
charged with selling illegal drugs should be tried as an adult, and
sixty-three percent agreed that a juvenile charged with a serious prop-
erty crime should be tried as an adult—even though fifty percent of
respondents said that they believed that the purpose of the juvenile
justice system was to “train, educate and counsel” offenders.141
While discerning the public’s attitudes about race proved more
difficult, it is clear that the media played a critical role.142  By the end
of the twentieth century, white Americans and Americans of color
were living increasingly segregated lives.143  Approximately seventy-
five percent of all whites lived in areas that were less than five percent
African-American.144  As a result, most whites obtained their informa-
tion about members of other races, and African-Americans in particu-
lar, not through direct experience, but from the news media.145  The
more homogeneous the community, the more dependent they were
on the media,146 and, interestingly, the more punitive their attitudes
were.147  According to a study conducted by Professor Frank Gilliam,
Jr., whites who lived in homogeneous neighborhoods were more likely
to endorse punitive crime policies and express negative stereotypes of
African-Americans when exposed to an African-American suspect in a
violent crime story than whites living in heterogeneous neighbor-
hoods.148  What was apparent is that, in the eyes of the public, race
and crime were inextricably entwined.
E. Ignoring the Juvenile Court
Ironically, the one place the media was not during the 1990s was
inside the juvenile court.  Until recently, most modern journalists had
national Gallup Poll of 2783 adults conducted in November 1965; and a national poll con-
ducted by Ben Gaffin and Associates that published the results of 2987 personal interviews
of adults conducted in June and July of 1952).
141. Id. at 31–32, 38 n.132 (citing a national poll published by the Public Policy Re-
search Institute of 1005 adults conducted from June 6–26, 1995).
142. See infra Part IV.B.1.
143. Feld, supra note 2, at 1523–24. R
144. Id. at 1524.
145. Id. at 1523–24.
146. See id.
147. See infra text accompanying note 148. R
148. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Where You Live and What You Watch?: The Impact of
Racial Proximity and Local Television News on Attitudes About Race and Crime, 55 POL. RES. Q.
755, 760, 770 (2002).
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never even crossed the threshold of a juvenile courtroom.149  This was
largely a function of the juvenile court’s presumptive closure laws that
were premised on the belief that wayward youth should be protected
from public scorn as they mended their ways.150  Surprisingly, for the
first half of the twentieth century, the juvenile court had been largely
open to the public and the press.151  In 1979, however, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that one of the historically important characteristics
of a juvenile court proceeding was its confidentiality, which shields the
juvenile from stigmatizing publicity.152
As of the early 1990s, presumptive closure laws still banned the
press and the public from juvenile court proceedings in many states.
As the juvenile justice system adopted a more punitive orientation
over the course of the decade, more and more state legislatures began
to open their juvenile courts.153  By the latter part of the decade, most
jurisdictions allowed some form of media access to the juvenile
court.154  As of 1998, laws in forty-two states allowed the media access
to the identity, and sometimes even the physical images, of certain
court-involved youth.155  Yet, there was still a dearth of media cover-
age.156  In some states, access on the books did not translate to mean-
ingful access on the ground, and journalists had to fight their way
inside the courtroom.157  Some legal scholars contend that the Su-
preme Court’s failure to explicitly extend its holding in Richmond
149. See Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Court-
room Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 155 (1999) (explaining that most
juvenile cases are closed to the public).
150. See id. (explaining that the founders of the juvenile court believed that juveniles
could be rehabilitated only if they were shielded from stigma).
151. See Barbara White Stack, Opening Juvenile Courts: Children Should Not Be Numbers,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 62, 62.  Despite pressure from nineteenth-
century Progressives to shield juvenile offenders from the stigma of publicity, the press
pushed back, arguing that secrecy would render the court susceptible to abuse. Id.
152. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979).
153. See PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME: 1996–97 UPDATE 8–11 (1998) (stating that in 1996 and 1997 alone, twelve states
enacted legislation opening juvenile court hearings); see also HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NA-
TIONAL REPORT 101 (1999) (noting that juvenile court records are more open as state stat-
utes reduce confidentiality).
154. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 153, at 101. R
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Emily Metzgar, Neither Seen Nor Heard: Media in America’s Juvenile Courts, 12
COMM. L. & POL’Y 177, 177 (2007) (discussing the “relative dearth of coverage of juvenile
justice issues in American journalism”).
157. See In re M.B., 819 A.2d 59, 60–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (describing newspaper’s
suit to gain access to Pennsylvania’s juvenile courts).
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Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia158 to the juvenile court has left the issue of
access in legal limbo.159
Today, fifteen states have presumptively closed delinquency pro-
ceedings,160 and every state now has legislation that allows informa-
tion contained in juvenile court records to be specifically released to
one or more of the following parties: the prosecutor, law enforce-
ment, social services agencies, schools, the victim, or the public.161
The media, too, has far greater access.  Fourteen states have laws that
allow the media to attend juvenile delinquency hearings as long as
they do not reveal the juvenile offender’s identity, thirty states give the
media access to public access hearings or records, and four states con-
dition media access to delinquency hearings or records on court per-
mission.162  Yet, there remains today very little reporting from inside
the juvenile court.163
III. FROM PARENS PATRIAE TO PENAL DISPROPORTIONALITY
A. The Modern Juvenile Court
The nation’s first juvenile court was established in Cook County,
Illinois, in 1899.164  A product of the prevailing Progressive philoso-
phy that child offenders should be treated rather than punished,165
158. 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980) (deciding that the public and the press have a right to
attend criminal trials, at least in the case of an adult defendant).
159. See Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond and Gault: Addressing Media
Access to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Through a Functional Analysis, 28 SETON HALL L. REV.
1155, 1155–56 (1998) (opining that the Supreme Court should apply the Richmond Newspa-
pers holding to juvenile proceedings); Louis A. Day, Media Access to Juvenile Courts, 61 JOUR-
NALISM Q. 751, 756 (1984) (same); Bazelon, supra note 149, at 159 (same). R
160. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 55, at 108 (indicating that as of 2004, fourteen R
states had presumptively open proceedings and twenty-one additional states had open pro-
ceedings for certain cases).
161. Id. at 109.
162. Id.
163. See DALE KUNKEL ET AL., COVERAGE IN CONTEXT: HOW THOROUGHLY THE NEWS ME-
DIA REPORT FIVE KEY CHILDREN’S ISSUES (2002) (finding that journalists fail to provide sys-
tematic context and a broader policy picture for the juvenile justice stories they reported).
The Jena Six case is illustrative.  Even as hundreds of journalists descended on Jena, Louisi-
ana, to report on the prosecution of six local youths for an allegedly racially motivated
assault of a white student, there was very little reporting from inside the local juvenile
court. See Raquel Christie, Double Whammy, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb.–Mar. 2008, available
at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4454 (criticizing the media’s coverage of the Jena Six
story); see also State v. Bailey, 969 So. 2d 610, 610–11 (La. 2007) (explaining the facts in-
volved in the “Jena 6” case and noting that media coverage was responsible for making
those facts widely known).
164. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 667 (2005).
165. Id. at 664.
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the juvenile court was envisioned as a rehabilitative alternative to the
criminal justice system.166  Central to its mission was the prevailing
Western principle of penal proportionality—that penalties imposed
by the State should be proportional to the blameworthiness of the
offender.167  Every element of the nascent court was designed with
this ideology in mind: Charges would be civil rather than criminal,
social servants and clinicians would replace lawyers  and juries,168
“crimes” would be called “delinquent behavior,” and judges would is-
sue “dispositions” rather than “sentences.”169  Broad discretionary
powers replaced formal rules of evidence and procedure,170 which, it
was thought, would best enable the states to carry out their role as
“Parens Patriae”—or parent of the country.171
By the 1960s, however, the system could not both parent and
punish effectively.  In fact, the Supreme Court lamented in 1966 that
juvenile offenders often receive the “worst of both worlds . . . neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regener-
ative treatment postulated for children.”172  Several key cases created
the due process protections that juveniles are given today,173 the most
seminal of which was the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision In re
166. Feld, supra note 2, at 1458; see Clarke, supra note 164, at 667–68 (observing that R
“[s]ince its inception, the juvenile justice system has been geared toward child welfare and
individual assessment and treatment”).  According to Professor Clarke, the Progressives’
approach to juvenile delinquency represented a departure from the colonial belief that
parents and educators “were free to use whatever means they deemed appropriate to cor-
rect misbehaving children.” Id. at 662.
167. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, On Passion’s Potential to Undermine Rationality: A Reply, 43
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 207, 223 (2009) (defining “penal proportionality” as the idea that
“one should be punished to the exact degree—no less, no more—to which he acted
wrongfully”).
168. See Feld, supra note 2, at 1458–60 (“Juvenile courts employed informal procedures, R
excluded lawyers and juries . . . [and] required a specialized judge trained in social sci-
ences and child development . . . assisted by social service personnel, clinicians, and proba-
tion officers . . . .”).
169. Clarke, supra note 164, at 667 n.34 (citation and internal quotation marks R
omitted).
170. See id. at 668 (noting that “courts were given maximum discretion to allow for flexi-
bility in diagnosis and treatment”); Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996
WIS. L. REV. 375, 378–79 (“In solving the problems of the juvenile brought before the
court, the juvenile court judge . . . was supposed to be free to consider all relevant informa-
tion without regard for rules of evidence.”).
171. Feld, supra note 2, at 1458–59; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) R
(defining parens patriae as “a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign
interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general
economy of the state, etc.”).
172. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
173. See Clarke, supra note 164, at 669–70 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. 541, In re Gault, 387 U.S. R
1 (1967), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), as the cases of the “‘due process revolu-
tion’” in juvenile justice).
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Gault,174 which held that the constitutional rights to notice, to coun-
sel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to a fair and impartial
hearing, and to protections against self-incrimination all applied to
juvenile court proceedings.175
Although the Court was willing to engraft certain due process
protections into juvenile proceedings, it expressly refused to grant
juveniles all of the procedural rights afforded to adults.  In 1971, the
Court held that juveniles had no constitutional right to a jury trial in
state delinquency proceedings on the ground that a judge’s adjudica-
tion was sufficient to meet the “fundamental fairness” standard re-
quired under the Due Process Clause.176  Thirteen years later, the
Court found that juveniles did not have a constitutional right to bail
pending the adjudication of their charges.177
These decisions would become all the more significant during
the “get tough” movement of the 1990s.  The push for more punitive
juvenile justice policies had already begun in the late 1980s, as mem-
bers of both parties started to see the benefits of running on “crack
down on crime” platforms.  The exploitation of the Willie Horton case
in the 1988 election may be the most famous example,178 but the po-
litical response in the wake of the Central Park Jogger attack is also
illustrative.  In the months after the incident, New York City Mayor
Edward Koch called for the death penalty for “wilding,” deeming the
seven suspects “monsters” and complaining that the juvenile justice
system was too lenient.179  Donald Trump paid $85,000 for full page
advertisements in the New York Times demanding the death penalty for
174. 387 U.S. 1.
175. Id. at 33–34, 41, 55, 57.
176. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).  The
Court specifically reasoned that “[t]he imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court
system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contra-
rily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in a unique
manner.” Id. at 547.
177. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984).
178. See generally Gregory W. Gwiasda, Network News Coverage of Campaign Advertisements,
29 AM. POL. RES. 481 (2001) (analyzing the impact of the Willie Horton advertisement in
the 1988 presidential election).  While serving a life sentence for murder, Willie Horton
was released as part of a weekend furlough program, but did not return and committed
rape and armed robbery.  John J. Donohue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the
Death Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249, 283 n.27 (2009).
179. Michael Welch et al., Moral Panic over Youth Violence: Wilding and the Manufacture of
Menace in the Media, 34 YOUTH & SOC’Y 3, 10 (2002); Hancock, supra note 78, at 39 (noting R
that “Mayor Ed Koch was often quoted calling the arrested boys ‘monsters’ and com-
plaining that juvenile laws were too soft”).
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the suspects in the Central Park Jogger attack,180 and mayoral candi-
date David Dinkins called for a “new ‘antiwilding law.’”181
As crime rates continued to climb in the early 1990s,182 the calls
for stiffer penalties for juvenile offenders reached a fever pitch.  Politi-
cians across the country saw an opening. Between 1992 and 1997
alone, legislatures in forty-five states enacted or enhanced waiver laws
that made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders to the adult criminal
justice system; thirty-one states gave both juvenile and criminal courts
expanded sentencing authority over juvenile offenders; forty-seven
states enacted laws that modified or removed traditional juvenile
court confidentiality provisions by making records and proceedings
more open; and twenty-two states expanded the role of juvenile crime
victims in the juvenile justice process.183  In the span of just a decade,
the mitigating factors of age and immaturity were effectively subordi-
nated to the goal of incapacitating a certain subset of offenders—an
ideological shift that turned the principle of penal proportionality on
its head.184  According to the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency, between 1990 and 2004, the incarceration of youth in adult
jails has increased 208%.185
Remarkably, however, even as the stakes have risen exponentially
for thousands of adolescent offenders, the juvenile court system has
held fast to many of its arcane practices and procedures.  At the same
time that most jurisdictions were handing out adult sentences, juve-
nile courts continued to deprive juveniles of three of the criminal jus-
tice system’s most fundamental checks against institutional bias—jury
trials,186 bail,187 and public oversight.188  Compounding this overall
lack of visibility was the fact that forty years after the Supreme Court
180. Welch et al., supra note 179, at 21; Hancock, supra note 78, at 39. R
181. Welch et al., supra note 179, at 9–10. R
182. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
183. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 55, at 96–97. R
184. See id. (explaining that “[t]he 1990s saw unprecedented change as state legislatures
cracked down on juvenile crime”).
185. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, YOUTH UNDER
AGE 18 IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2006), http://act4jj.org/media/fact
sheets/factsheet_24.pdf.
186. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(holding that juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to jury trials, among other things,
because “[t]he imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not
strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an
attrition of the juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in a unique manner”).
187. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1966) (finding that juveniles are
not entitled to the same basic rights as adults in criminal court, including bail); see also
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256–57 (1984) (holding that juveniles can be preventively
detained before trial consistent with due process).
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upheld the right to counsel in juvenile court, many juveniles still ap-
peared without attorneys.189  Finally, perhaps the most arcane yet
most resistant feature of the juvenile court was its almost complete
reliance on discretionary decisionmaking.  Despite the dramatic up-
tick in punitive outcomes in the 1990s, juvenile court intake officers,
prosecutors, probation officers, and, to a lesser extent, judges in many
jurisdictions have retained their nearly unfettered discretion to dis-
pose of the juveniles before them.190  The net result was a juvenile
court system that, by the mid-1990s, was meting out all of the punish-
ment, without the due process, accountability, and visibility of its adult
counterpart.
B. The Problem of Disproportionate Minority Contact
For at least ninety years, the percentage of minority youth present
in the U.S. justice system has far exceeded their proportion in the
general population.191  While social scientists had known for decades
that adolescents of color were more likely to be arrested, detained,
formally charged in juvenile court, transferred to adult court, and
confined to secure residential facilities than their white counter-
parts,192 these disparities soared during the 1980s and 1990s.193  Be-
tween 1983 and 1997, the overall youth detention population
188. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 153, at 95 (noting that juvenile proceedings are R
“quasi-civil” and “may be confidential,” while criminal proceedings are “open” and accessi-
ble to the public (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. See JUDITH B. JONES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION, ACCESS TO COUNSEL 2 (2004) (“In some jurisdictions, as many as 80 to
90 percent of youth waive their right to an attorney [at some point in the process] because
they do not know the meaning of the word ‘waive’ or understand its consequences.”); see
also PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUN-
SEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2006) (reporting that
“judges and parents in Florida courts engage in practices and procedures that pressure
youth, directly or indirectly, to waive the right to counsel”).
190. See FELD, supra note 12, at 140–45 (discussing juvenile courts’ continued reliance R
on discretionary decisionmaking, which often requires officials with little training to make
clinical predictions about a juvenile’s future behavior through an assessment of various
social status factors that are beyond the youth’s control).
191. As far back as the 1920s, criminologists were attempting to identify the root causes
of minority overrepresentation. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NE-
GRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 966–79 (1944) (arguing that racism in laws and the
criminal justice system, as well as poverty and other social factors, help explain higher
crime statistics among African-Americans); Thornsten Sellin, The Negro Criminal: A Statisti-
cal Note, 140 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 53–54 (1928) (explaining that the data
collected only represents the apparent, not the real, criminality involving African-Ameri-
cans and explaining that this may be because of the treatment by the agencies of criminal
justice).
192. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 131, at 1–3 (noting and detailing the attention R
given to the overrepresentation of minorities in the Nation’s prisons); see also POPE ET AL.,
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increased by forty-seven percent.194  While the detained white popula-
tion increased by just twenty-one percent, however, the detained mi-
nority population grew by seventy-six percent.195  In other words, four
out of five youth newly detained during this fifteen-year period were
youth of color.196
In 2002, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion (“OJJDP”) altered its methodological approach to calculating dis-
proportionality and adopted the Disproportionate Minority Contact
Relative Rate Index (“RRI”).197  The RRI tests for disparity by compar-
ing the total volume of minority youth present at a particular decision
point with the corresponding percentage of white youth.198  Though
more methodologically refined than the general population statistics
analysis, the RRIs for 2005 tell largely the same story as the old meth-
ods—that, with the exception of adjudication, minorities fared worse
than whites at every stage of the juvenile justice process and that the
effects were cumulative.199
The causes of DMC are more difficult to discern.  Two primary
theories have historically been advanced: The first is that children of
color commit more serious offenses than other youths; the second is
that race bias plays a role in juvenile justice system processing.200
While differential offending contributes to DMC, research shows that
the statistical differences between the offending patterns of white
youth and minority youth are simply not great enough to account for
the racial disparities observed at any of the processing points in the
juvenile justice system.201  Social scientists have increasingly focused
supra note 23, at 5 (finding that twenty-five of thirty-four studies reviewed reported “race R
effects” in the processing of youth).
193. ELEANOR HINTON HOYTT ET AL., PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM: REDUC-
ING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION 10 (2001), http://www.aecf.org/upload/
publicationfiles/reducing%20racial%20disparities.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 55, at 189. R
198. Id. at 190.  The RRI Matrix adds greater detail by comparing the RRI at each deci-
sion point with that of the previous decision point to “reveal the nature of decision dispari-
ties.” Id.
199. C. PUZZANCHERA & B. ADAMS, NATIONAL DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT
DATABOOK (2005), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/asp/display.asp?
year=2005&offense=1&displaytype=rri.  Specifically, in 2005, minority youth were 1.7 times
as likely to be arrested, 1.1 times as likely to be waived to adult court, and 1.2 times as likely
to be placed in a secure facility as white youth. Id.
200. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 131, at 7. R
201. HOYTT ET AL., supra note 193, at 21.  While it is true that African-American youth R
commit “slightly more violent crime” than white youth, they commit “about the same
amount of property crime, and less drug crime than white youth,” and “[i]n no category
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on multiple regression research that is able to isolate a race effect by
comparing outcomes between “similarly situated” white youth and
youth of color through the disaggregation of other relevant legal and
non-legal variables.202  Significantly, most of these studies have found
that race-neutral criteria cannot by themselves account for the dispari-
ties observed in processing outcomes—in other words, but for the pres-
ence of race bias, overrepresentation would not exist to the same
degree.203
These so-called “race effects,”204 research indicates, are most
likely the product of the unconscious bias that flourishes amid the
system’s excessive discretion, inadequate procedural safeguards, sub-
can the marginal differences in white and African-American behavior explain the huge
disparity in arrest or incarceration rates.” Id. at 19.  African-American youth are arrested at
twice the rate of white youth for drug offenses and two-and-a-half times the rate of white
youth for weapons offenses even though white youth report substantially higher levels of
drug use and commission of weapons crimes. Id. at 20–21.  According to OJJDP, a
1997–2001 survey commissioned by the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that African-
American and Latino youth ages twelve to seventeen self-reported higher rates of gang
involvement, property theft over fifty dollars, and serious assault than white youth ages
twelve to seventeen, but fewer instances of vandalism, property theft less than fifty dollars,
drug sales, and firearm possession. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 55, at 70.  Similarly, a R
National Institute of Drug Abuse Survey of high school seniors found that “white youth
reported using heroin and cocaine at seven times the rate of African American youth,” and
a National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that “white youth ages 12–17 reported
selling drugs a third more frequently than African American youth.” HOYTT ET AL., supra
note 193, at 20–21. R
202. Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Minority Youths and Juvenile Justice: Disproportionate Minor-
ity Contact After Nearly 20 Years of Reform Efforts, YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST., Jan. 2007, at
71, 75.
203. To date, five comprehensive reviews of the literature demonstrate that legal and
extralegal factors alone are unable to account for race differentials present in the juvenile
justice system. See Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Process-
ing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE 23 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (provid-
ing empirical demonstration of racial disparities in juvenile justice); Rodney L. Engen et
al., Racial Disparities in the Punishment of Youth: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of the
Literature, 49 SOC. PROBLEMS 194, 195 (2002) (reviewing “theoretical perspectives on racial
disparity, highlighting the central predictions of each perspective”); Michael J. Leiber, Dis-
proportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to
Address the Issue, CRIME & DELINQ., Jan. 2002, at 3, 3–4 (identifying “the extent of minority
overrepresentation in states’ juvenile justice systems and assessment of the causes of
DMC”); POPE ET AL., supra note 23, at 2 (reviewing studies from March 1989 to December R
2001); CARL E. POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, MINORITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESEARCH
SUMMARY (1995) (confirming the overrepresentation of minorities in the juvenile justice
system); see also Carl E. Pope & Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement/
Contact (DMC): The Federal Initiative, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra, at 351 (pro-
viding “a historical overview of the activities employed to address disproportionate minor-
ity youth confinement/contact”).
204. See supra note 23. R
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jective decisionmaking criteria, and “policy initiatives rooted in dis-
torted, ethnocentric views of what is in the best interests and
appropriate for children, particularly children of parents accorded
lesser social status.”205  This theory finds support in one particular
study.  In an attempt to determine why African-American youth in
three Washington State counties were receiving harsher sentencing
recommendations than white youth charged with the same crimes,
sociologists George Bridges and Sara Steen examined more than two
hundred county probation reports.206  After controlling for factors
such as age, gender, and offense history, Bridges and Steen found that
the officers were more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of mi-
nority youth to “internal attributions,” such as personal failure, inade-
quate moral character, and personality, but saw the criminal behavior
of white youth as a product of “external attributions,” such as poor
home life, lack of appropriate role models, and environment.207
These perceptions, in turn, led the officers to recommend state inter-
vention for minority youth at greater rates.208
IV. MEDIA, BIAS, AND LEGAL DECISIONMAKING
Suppose it is December 1998 in Palm Beach, Florida, and a prose-
cutor in the juvenile system is watching the local ten o’clock news,
which he does most weeknights before going to bed.  In recent years,
the lead story has often involved violent crime, replete with a blan-
keted body lying on a sidewalk, police cars, and cadres of sobbing rela-
tives.  On this particular night, the story is about a fight at an Orlando
205. Kempf-Leonard, supra note 202, at 78; see also MICHAEL J. LEIBER, THE CONTEXTS OF R
JUVENILE JUSTICE DECISION MAKING: WHEN RACE MATTERS 105–16 (2003) (finding that in
one juvenile court, a strong emphasis on parens patriae coupled with an influx of multiple
minority groups into the area and perceptions that such minority groups do not abide to
middle-class standards of dress, demeanor, marriage, and respect for authority led to dif-
ferent outcomes for minority youth and white youth); Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Fra-
zier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 412 (1996) (concluding that “institutional racism” rather than “in-
tentional race discrimination” likely accounted for the clear indications of “racial dispari-
ties in processing” observed in their Florida study).
206. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 557–58
(1998).
207. Id. at 561, 564–67 (emphasis omitted).
208. Id. at 564–67.  Similarly, in their study of processing decisions in the Florida juve-
nile justice system, Professors Bishop and Frazier observed that “in delinquency cases,
black family systems generally tend to be perceived in a more negative light.”  Bishop &
Frazier, supra note 205, at 408–09; see also Leiber & Fox, supra note 43, at 489 (attributing R
observed negative race effects in outcomes to “racial stereotyping of African Americans as
delinquent, prone to drug offenses, dangerous, and unsuitable for treatment”).
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high school, which has left a seventeen-year-old junior dead.  Cameras
capture the suspect as he is ushered into a waiting patrol car.  Though
his back is to the camera, the prosecutor can tell he is African-Ameri-
can.  “Just another act of random violence,” a reporter remarks.
The next morning, the prosecutor returns to his office and sits
down at his desk.  Waiting for him is a list of a dozen or so juveniles
who have been arrested in the area over the last month.  One of the
juveniles on the list, Anthony L., was arrested a few weeks earlier for a
school-based offense.  The police report alleges that the fifteen-year-
old approached a classmate in a school cafeteria and demanded
money.  When the boy refused, Anthony reportedly reached into the
boy’s pocket and removed two dollars.  From the mug shot, the prose-
cutor sees that Anthony is African-American.
Even though Anthony has no prior record, the prosecutor knows
he has wide latitude to determine what charges to bring.  If he charges
Anthony with a felony, he knows he can file the case directly in the
criminal division of the circuit court.209  As the prosecutor considers
his options, his assistant appears at his doorway to tell him that the
judge is about to take the bench.  He stands and gathers several stacks
of paper from his desk.  As he walks out of his office, he hands
Anthony L.’s police report to the assistant.  “Direct file.  Strong-arm
Rob.”
Did the local news story about the Orlando fight play a role in the
prosecutor’s decision to charge Anthony L. as an adult?  The prosecu-
tor would undoubtedly say no, and the reality is that he would proba-
bly be sincere in his self-assessment.  Social cognition theory, however,
suggests that the news story could have played such a role.210
A. The Politics of Motivational Bias
It is likely that the Palm Beach prosecutor is an elected actor.211
In thirty-nine states, trial court judges must also stand for election.212
Over the last two decades, these numbers have prompted legal schol-
ars, psychologists, and political scientists to consider the convergence
of these often competing roles—those of elected politician and ad-
209. See FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b) (2006) (directing that a Florida prosecutor may seek
to charge a sixteen or seventeen-year-old defendant as an adult for a felony offense when
“the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed”).
210. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. R
211. Cf. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECU-
TORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 3 (2006) (“In 2005, 85% of chief prosecutors reported they
had been elected or appointed to a 4-year term.”).
212. Huber & Gordon, supra note 30, at 247. R
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ministrator of justice.213  After all, just as elected prosecutors and
judges must uphold the rule of law, they are also beholden to the
preferences of their constituents.  The result, social scientists suggest,
is that social and political influences may serve to “contour” and
“craft” the way in which courts apportion justice.214  In psychological
terms, the political climate may “motivate” prosecutors and, to a lesser
extent, judges to employ particular strategies and reasoning to reach
politically popular decisions.215
A recent qualitative study of three southern California juvenile
courts, which focuses on the ways in which prosecutors divert judicial
discretion from judges, is instructive.216  The study observed that “the
sense of a more punitive political climate in the broader community
(‘society,’ the Legislature, appellate courts) gives prosecutors the
moral authority within the courtroom to use the legal maneuvers to
divert judicial discretion, or in other instances to force bench officers
to abdicate their own discretion.”217  It concluded that one of the “ex-
ternally oriented goals of the prosecutors’ office” is to “project[ ] an
image that they are holding youth accountable to their offenses and
that ‘justice’ is being served[, which] determined what would happen
in the courtroom.”218  By contrast, defense attorneys operating within
this “get tough” climate are “shackled by the stigma attached to their
213. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 39, at 413, 418 (elected prosecutors); Huber & Gordon, R
supra note 30, at 248 (elected trial judges). R
214. See Harris, supra note 39, at 390 (explaining the ways in which “pressures from both R
public constituencies and supervisors can be exerted on court officials’ decisionmaking
practices within the courtroom”).
215. Professor Kunda calls this “motivated reasoning”:
[“Motivated reasoning” is generally defined as] affect[ing] reasoning through re-
liance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing,
and evaluating beliefs. . . .
The motivated reasoning phenomena under review fall into two major cate-
gories: those in which the motive is to arrive at an accurate conclusion, whatever
it may be, and those in which the motive is to arrive at a particular, directional
conclusion. . . .  [B]oth kinds of goals affect reasoning by influencing the choice
of beliefs and strategies applied to a given problem.  But accuracy goals lead to
the use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate,
whereas directional goals lead to the use of those that are considered most likely
to yield the desired conclusion.
Kunda, supra note 38, at 480–81. R
216. See Harris, supra note 39, at 398, 418 (explaining that throughout the course of this R
study, the prosecutors’ office tried to divert discretion from judges and that additionally
some judges “abdicated their decisionmaking power in fear of the consequences of exercis-
ing it”).
217. Id. at 413.
218. Id. at 418; see also David Pritchard, Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-Setting
Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 143, 145 (1986) (observing that
“[m]aintaining a public image as a crime-fighter” may influence prosecutorial decision-
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clients” and  “are usually the weakest competitors for influence within
the courthouse, and as a result end up getting along by going
along.”219
So, how does the media fit into this dynamic?  During the 1990s,
the superpredator discourse helped shape the political climate within
which juvenile court insiders operated—a political climate which, by
all indications, demanded that insiders “get tough” on juveniles.220
While it was rarely explicit, the volume, content, and framing of crime
news stories implied that the most deviant and dangerous of these
offenders—the “Willie Hortons”221—were those of color.  In the
words of Professor Feld, “[o]ver the past few decades, the media have
reinforced conservative interpretations of crime and put a black face
on it.”222
B. The Automaticity of Implicit Bias
While the role of implicit bias in shaping insider decisionmaking
may be more complex and attenuated than that of motivational bias,
it is no less important.  To put this theory in context, I begin with a
brief overview of social cognition theory and the concept of implicit
bias.  Contrary to the prevailing assumption that human beings are
rational and deliberate animals for whom consciousness is the pre-
dominant mode, some cognitive scientists believe that unconscious
mental processes largely control our thoughts and behaviors.223  We
cope with what would otherwise be an overwhelming environment by
unwittingly engaging in a series of complex cognitive processes that
enable us to parse and react to incoming information.224  We respond
to external stimuli by selectively “mapping” the information we re-
ceive into established categories.225  When we encounter another
human being, for example, we might map our perceptions into cate-
gories associated with social characteristics, such as age, gender, race,
making “to the extent of stressing adversary dispositions in publicized cases, regardless of
the strength of evidence against the defendant”).
219. Harris, supra note 39, at 415 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). R
220. See infra Part IV.B.
221. See supra note 178. R
222. Feld, supra note 2, at 1526. R
223. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 35–36 (2008) (ques-
tioning whether “conscious will is an illusion created by people thinking about an action
before performing it”).
224. Kang, supra note 2, at 1499. R
225. Id. at 1498–99.
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or sexual orientation.226  The categorization of these perceptions acti-
vates cognitive structures called “schemas,”227 and from the informa-
tion or “meanings” embedded in our schemas, we draw inferences
and make predictions about the person.228
When we map a person into a racial category, we activate “racial
schemas” along with the “racial meanings” embedded in those
schemas.229  These racial meanings may include both cognitive beliefs
about racial groups (“stereotypes”) and affective feelings about such
groups (“prejudices”).230  According to psychologists, our respective
categories and schemas influence every aspect of our cognition—what
information we receive, how that information is classified,  how we re-
act to it, and how we remember it.231
More mystifying is that all of this happens whether we want it to
or not.  Psychologists believe that human beings think, make deci-
sions, and react to other people along a continuum of modes that
range from purely automatic at one extreme to controlled at the
other.232  When we react automatically, our thought processes are un-
intentional and unconscious.233  At the other end of the spectrum,
these processes are conscious and deliberate.  Research suggests that
“schematic thinking” can operate at both ends of the continuum.234
How do we gauge the content of the racial meanings embedded
in our racial schemas?  The reality is that self-reported attitudes have
become almost meaningless—most people are not aware of the ste-
reotypes or prejudices they possess or, if they are, are unwilling to
226. Id. at 1499 & n.47 (citing Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in
2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 376 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998)).
227. A “schema” has been defined as a “cognitive structure that represents knowledge
about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those
attributes.”  Id. at 1498 (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Id. at 1498–99.
229. Id. at 1499.
230. Id. at 1500.
231. Id. at 1493 (defining “racial mechanics” as “the ways in which race alters intraper-
sonal, interpersonal, and intergroup interactions” (citing Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1130, 1138–46 (2000))).
232. See Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in DUAL-PROCESS
THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231, 231–42, 249 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds.,
1999) (noting citations in the social-scientific literature to “the continuum model,” which
posits a continuum between automatic and cognitive processes to account for the range of
ways that people form impressions of others).
233. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct
and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 231–33 (1996)
(discussing theoretical and empirical models in support of an “automaticity” hypothesis).
234. Kang, supra note 2, at 1506. R
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admit to them.235  To get around this, social psychologists have begun
to develop indirect ways to measure racial meanings.236  The most re-
cent phase of this research has sought to take advantage of the auto-
maticity of schematic thinking through what are called reaction-time
studies.  Scientists trigger automatic cognitive processes through sub-
liminal exposure to external stimuli, a technique known as “priming,”
which activates a subject’s racial schemas, but they do not trigger con-
scious awareness of either the prime or its impact.237  Subjects are
then asked to perform a subsequent task, which may be linguistic, in-
terpretative, or physical.238  When the prime and the task are consis-
tent with the subject’s schema, the subject’s response time is faster;
when they are inconsistent, it is slower.239  The time differentials ob-
served are viewed as measurements of an individual’s “implicit
bias.”240
These studies have evolved into an entire industry devoted to
measuring implicit bias and a prototype called the Implicit Associa-
tion Test (“IAT”).241  Not surprisingly, the IAT, along with a host of
other tests, have repeatedly documented varying degrees of implicit
race bias against African-Americans, Latinos, Jews, Asians, and non-
Americans.242  This implicit bias, in turn, has been shown to have de-
monstrable effects on performance, judgment, and treatment of
others.243
1. The “Superpredator” Virus
An important inquiry is, of course, where do racial meanings
come from?  By and large, they come from “vicarious experiences”
235. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. R
236. Kang, supra note 2, at 1507 & n.78 (describing attempts by social psychologists to R
identify and measure “symbolic,” “modern,” “ambivalent,” and “aversive” racism).
237. Id. at 1505 & n.72 (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 1508–09.
239. Id. at 1510 (“Tasks in the schema-consistent arrangement should be easier, and so
it is for most of us.  How much easier . . . provides a measure of implicit bias.”).
240. Id. at 1509.
241. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998)
(describing three IATs and assessing the test’s usefulness for measuring evaluative associa-
tions).  The IAT, which tests associations between categories (for example, “White”) and
attributes (for example, “smart”), is now available electronically. See Harvard University,
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited May 25, 2010).
242. Kang, supra note 2, at 1512. R
243. Id. at 1514–35; see also Blasi, supra note 40, at 1256–57 (citing neuroscience as sup- R
porting the proposition that “basic cognitive mechanisms . . . predispose us toward
stereotypes”).
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with racial others.244  While our direct experiences may be more influ-
ential, our vicarious experiences are more numerous.245  In a society
as racially segregated as ours, Professors Robert Entman and Andrew
Rojecki theorize that “[w]hites depend heavily on cultural material,
especially media images” for cataloging racial others.246  Problems
arise, however, when the material presented by the media is im-
balanced or inaccurate.  When the images transmitted by the media
are distorted, the racial meanings in our schemas become
distorted.247
This is borne out in one particular study conducted near the
height of the superpredator frenzy.  In 1998, political scientists Frank
Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar designed an experiment to test the im-
pact of a “crime news script.”248  They created four separate versions
of a fictitious local newscast that contained a short crime segment in
the middle.249  Before the more than two thousand participants saw
the videotape, they were asked to complete a short questionnaire
soliciting information about their economic and social backgrounds,
their political beliefs, and customary media habits.250  They were then
divided into four groups.  Some participants watched a story in which
the alleged perpetrator of a murder was an African-American male.251
Other subjects were given the same news report, but this time featur-
ing a white male as the murder suspect.252  A third group of partici-
pants watched the news report edited to exclude information
concerning the identity of the perpetrator.253  A fourth control group
saw no crime news story at all.254  The participants were then asked to
complete a second, longer questionnaire that probed their attitudes
toward crime and punishment.255
The results were astonishing.  More than sixty percent of those
who had watched the crime report with no reference to a perpetrator
falsely recalled seeing one, and of those, seventy percent identified
244. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1539 (defining “vicarious experiences” as “stories of or R
simulated engagements with racial others provided through various forms of the media or
narrated by parents and our peers”).
245. Id. at 1540.
246. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 100, at 49. R
247. Kang, supra note 2, at 1540. R
248. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 15, at 561. R
249. Id. at 563.
250. Id. at 564.
251. Id. at 563.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 564–65.
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the perpetrator as African-American.256  White participants who had
seen the version with the African-American suspect exhibited an in-
creased tendency to attribute crime to individual failings and in-
creased negative attitudes toward African-Americans that exceeded
the increases observed in those who had seen the version with the
white suspect.257  They also exhibited a statistically significant six per-
cent increase in levels of support for punitive crime policies and more
than a ten percent increase in levels of what Gilliam and Iyengar re-
ferred to as “new,” “hidden,” or “covert” racism.258
Borrowing Professor Kang’s analogy, I suggest that what Gilliam
and Iyengar’s mug shot study detected was the presence of something
akin to a “superpredator virus.”  When we watch a news program,
Kang explains, racial imagery associated with crime stories enters our
subconscious and, like a computer virus, “silently waits to take ac-
tion . . . which the user, if conscious of it, would disavow.”259  “In other
words,” Professor Kang suggests, “as we consume local news, we
download a sort of Trojan Horse virus that increases our implicit
bias,”260 which has critical and demonstrable real-world consequences
in how we interpret and interact with others.
Unbeknownst to those who watched the newscast with the Afri-
can-American suspect, at the same time they were obtaining what they
consciously believed to be credible and objective facts about an inci-
dent of local crime, they were also downloading subliminal messages
about the intersections of race, youth, and violence.  Like a virus,
these messages installed themselves into viewers’ racial schemas,
where, without their knowledge, the messages increased the viewers’
implicit biases about age, race, and causes of and solutions to violent
crime.  When participants were then questioned about their views on
crime and race, they retrieved not only the preexisting racial mean-
ings embedded in their schemas (which were prerecorded in ques-
tionnaires), but also the virally enhanced content added just moments
before.  It was this amplified or enflamed content that accounted for
the observable increases in punitiveness and “new racism.”  In their
analysis of these findings, Gilliam and Iyengar emphasized that the
relatively modest increases in unconscious bias they observed after a
five-second exposure to a single photo were likely to be even more
pronounced in the “cluttered context of everyday news coverage in
256. Id. at 564.
257. Id. at 567–70.
258. Id. at 566–69.
259. Kang, supra note 2, at 1553–54. R
260. Id. at 1490.
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which viewers encounter multiple visual cues about criminal
suspects.”261
2. The Insider Effect
What effect would these biases have on juvenile court insiders,
like the Palm Beach prosecutor?  The logical assumption is that the
“outsiders” in Gilliam and Iyengar’s study would be susceptible to me-
dia hyperbole in ways that juvenile court insiders would not.  Yet,
while there is evidence that subliminal racial cues are less likely to
interfere with the performance of trained professionals than they are
of lay subjects,262 multiple studies have detected the presence of cog-
nitive bias in decisionmaking by prosecutors,263 judges,264 and proba-
tion officers.265
One recent study is particularly illuminating.  In 2004, Professors
Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery set out to expand the theory that
sociologists Sara Steen and George Bridges had espoused six years ear-
lier—that unconscious racial stereotypes can affect how juvenile pro-
bation officers perceive and subsequently treat juvenile offenders.266
The participants included a racially diverse and gender-balanced
group of ninety-one juvenile probation officers in Los Angeles.267
Members of the experiment first performed what the researchers
called a “mind-clearing task,” which required them to track a string of
letters on a rapidly flashing computer screen.268  Amid the flashing
letters, however, certain officers were subliminally exposed to words
commonly associated with African-Americans (such as black,
261. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 15, at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
262. Generalized research shows that subliminal racial cues are not as likely to interfere
with judgment and performance when the subject has been trained for the task at hand.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. R
263. See Burke, supra note 43, at 1632 (arguing that even the most conscientious and R
ethical prosecutors fall prey to cognitive bias).
264. See Guthrie et al., supra note 43, at 778–80 (describing a study of 167 federal magis- R
trate judges, which revealed that they are susceptible to biases and heuristics when making
decisions); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1227, 1229–30 (2006) (exploring whether specialist judges are susceptible to heuristics and
biases when making decisions); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Infor-
mation?: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1258–59 (2005)
(reporting experimental evidence showing that judges have difficulty deliberately disre-
garding relevant, but inadmissible, evidence when making merits decisions).
265. See Bridges & Steen, supra note 34, at 555–57 (finding significant differences in R
probation officers’ attributions about the causes of a crime depending on the race of the
offender).
266. Graham & Lowery, supra note 34, at 484. R
267. Id. at 494.
268. Id. at 488.
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homeboy, rap, and so on), while others were exposed to race-neutral
words.269  Participants then read two vignettes about a hypothetical
adolescent who allegedly committed either a property crime or an as-
sault.270  In both, the race of the offender was left unstated, and the
scenarios were ambiguous about the causes of the crime.271  After
reading the vignettes, the probation officers rated the offender on va-
rious personal traits, such as hostility and immaturity, and made judg-
ments about the offender’s culpability, expected recidivism, and
deserved punishment.272  In contrast to subjects who did not receive
the racial “priming,” the probation officers who had been exposed to
the subliminal messaging “judged the alleged offender to be less im-
mature and more violent” as well as “more culpable, more likely to
reoffend, and more deserving of punishment,” and “their global trait
ratings were more negative.”273  The results were consistent even
among officers who self-reported, and likely believed, that they held
no racial bias toward minorities.274  “What’s particularly interesting,”
Professor Lowery would later remark, “is that many of the officers
were African Americans themselves.  This shows the degree to which
even African Americans can be affected by the negative associations in
the environment.”275
By all accounts, the superpredator discourse dominated not just
local news during the 1990s, but network and cable broadcasts, news-
papers, and magazines as well.276  Since the viruses it carried had the
effect of increasing the implicit biases of those who were exposed to it
for mere seconds, as was the case in Gilliam and Iyengar’s study, there
is every reason to believe that its effect on regular media consumers
269. Id. at 488–90.  The sixteen race prime words in the first list were as follows: graffiti,
Harlem, homeboy, jerricurl, minority, mulatto, negro, rap, segregation, basketball, black,
Cosby, gospel, hood, Jamaica, and roots. Id. at 489 n.5.  The words in the second list were
as follows: afro, Oprah, islam, Haiti, pimp, dreadlocks, plantation, slum, Tyson, welfare,
athlete, ghetto, calypso, reggae, rhythm, and soul. Id. The sixteen words in the first race-
neutral list were as follows: baby, enjoyment, heaven, kindness, summer, sunset, truth, play-
ful, accident, coffin, devil, funeral, horror, mosquito, stress, and toothache. Id. The words
in the second list were as follows: warmth, trust, sunrise, rainbow, pleasure, paradise, laugh-
ter, birthday, virus, paralysis, loneliness, jealousy, hell, execution, death, and agony. Id.
270. Id. at 487.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 496.
274. Id. (“When an ethnicity was incorrectly reported, respondents again were more
likely to ‘recall’ that the alleged offender was African American than either Latino or
White.”).
275. Marguerite Rigoglioso, Racial Stereotypes Can Be Unconscious but Reversible (Jan.
2008), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/hr_racialstereotypes.shtml.
276. See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text. R
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would be at least as strong.  If, like the rest of us, juvenile court judges,
prosecutors, and probation officers were watching and reading the
news on a regular basis during the 1990s—and by most accounts they
were277—they, like the subjects in Graham and Lowery’s experiment,
were unwittingly downloading superpredator viruses that affected
their unconscious beliefs and feelings about the relative culpability
and salvageability of juvenile offenders of color.
Is there reason to believe that the superpredator discourse would
interfere less with the mental processes of those whose job it is to eval-
uate minority offenders on a daily basis?  Consider the Palm Beach
prosecutor.  In all likelihood, our prosecutor spends hours each day
working in a courthouse filled with young people of color, like
Anthony L.  But while he might be exposed to dozens of police re-
ports, mug shots, and rap sheets bearing images of these youth, he
may never have a conversation with any of them.  More importantly,
the data that he is taking in and ultimately “mapping” into his cogni-
tive library through these indirect experiences are bound to be nega-
tive or, at the very least, neutral.278  So, even before the prosecutor
turns on the ten o’clock news, he may already have had a day of vicari-
ous encounters that altered his racial schema.  News stories like the
one about the Orlando fight can act as the proverbial icing on the
cake.  Even if he is not conscious of it, the mediated images of minor-
ity juveniles committing crimes in his own backyard reinforce what the
prosecutor may already suspect: Kids of color are more violent, less
repentant, and more in need of punitive segregation than their white
counterparts.279
How might these mediated biases translate into increased racial
disparity?  Recall the Washington State study by Bridges and Steen
that explicitly linked attributional biases—the tendency of probation
277. As former Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in his 1987 book about the Court,
judges “read newspapers and magazines . . . watch news on television, [and] talk to [their]
friends about current events.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS,
HOW IT IS 98 (1987); see also Pritchard, supra note 218, at 143–44 (noting, for example, that R
prosecutors are “avid readers of newspaper stories about their cases”).
278. A prosecutor who is surrounded in his daily routine only by crime victims, police
officers, and other prosecutors might develop a deepened presumption of guilt that can
contribute to cognitive bias.  See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor
and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 486–87 (2005) (noting that prosecutorial relationships
affect prosecutorial loyalties); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Concep-
tual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 208 (1988) (noting that prosecutors are typically
isolated from populations who might trigger empathy for defendants, while surrounded by
populations “who can graphically establish that the defendant deserves punishment, and
who have no reason to be concerned with competing values of justice”).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 248–58. R
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officers to attribute the criminal behavior of minority youth to disposi-
tional forces and that of white youth to ecological forces—with more
punitive outcomes.280  In the case of the prosecutor, simply seeing
Anthony L.’s mug shot may have triggered these attributional biases,
which, without the prosecutor’s awareness, influenced his decision to
charge Anthony L. as an adult.
C. The Juvenile Justice System as Host
In many respects, the lack of accountability and oversight within
the juvenile court enable biased decisionmaking.  The recent case of
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, is a case in point.  In 2009, Luzerne
County Judges Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan pleaded guilty
to accepting financial kickbacks in exchange for placing children in
private residential detention facilities in a scheme that was remarkable
for both its complexity and audacity.281  By all accounts, Judge
Ciavarella was especially brazen in his pursuit of the scheme: He rou-
tinely failed to inform the children appearing before him in juvenile
court of their right to a trial, their right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and the burden of the government to prove every element
of its case beyond a reasonable doubt.282  In some cases, Judge
Ciavarella went so far as to adjudicate youth delinquents and place
them in detention without even taking a plea.283  When he held de-
tention hearings, they lasted no more than a few minutes, with no
opportunity for the youth to speak on her behalf or to present testi-
mony or evidence.284  To increase the number of out-of-home place-
ments, Judge Ciavarella exerted pressure on probation officers to
recommend detention of juveniles even when detention was inappro-
priate and to change recommendations of release to recommenda-
tions of detention.285  Amazingly, the scheme began to unravel, not
because the dozens of prosecutors, probation officers, correctional of-
280. Bridges & Steen, supra note 34, at 564–67; see also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 205, R
at 409–10 (noting that “many respondents indicated that juvenile justice officers make
decisions influenced in part by perceptions (or misperceptions) of youths’ family back-
grounds and circumstances”); Leiber & Fox, supra note 43, at 489 (concluding that “race R
affects case processing and outcomes directly, in combination with other factors, and indi-
rectly through detention”).
281. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Conahan, No. 3:09-CR-028 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26,
2009) (pleading guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States); Plea
Agreement, United States v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-CR-028 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2009) (same).
282. Amended Complaint-Class Action, H.T. v. Ciavarella, Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-
00357 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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ficers, and defense attorneys who were privy to its daily fallout cried
foul, but because the Juvenile Law Center (“JLC”), a public interest
law firm three counties away, began to investigate statistical abnormal-
ities in attorney waiver rates in Luzerne.286  In 2007, the JLC launched
an investigation, and in 2008 it petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to enjoin the County from continuing to conduct delinquency
hearings without counsel or lawful waivers of counsel.287  The Court
denied the petition in December 2008, but granted a motion for re-
consideration one month later after evidence of the kickback scheme
surfaced.288
The case of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, is extreme, but it
serves as a poignant reminder that there may be no arm of our justice
system more susceptible to abuse than the juvenile court.  Whether it
is the blatant corruption that went undetected for five years in
Luzerne County, or the unconscious race bias that percolated under
the surface in Washington State,289 the juvenile court has proven itself
an especially fertile host to decisionmaking pathologies.  It has also
proven itself particularly resistant to formalized efforts to cure them.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the superpredator narra-
tive had faded from the lexicon, and even John DiIulio was rethinking
his stance.  In 2001, he told the New York Times, “If I knew then what I
know now, I would have shouted for prevention of crimes.”290  By
then, however, the damage had already been done.  In a little over a
decade, the juvenile justice system had morphed from an institution
286. See Editorial, Seeking Justice, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 2010 (describing how the JLC
embarked on a mission to correct “injustices against thousands of juveniles who were de-
nied their legal rights in Luzerne County’s court system” and expressed shock at the “‘vast
conspiracy of silence’ among Luzerne County officials”).
287. Application of J.V.R., H.T. & Similarly Situated Youth For Exercise of King’s Bench
Power or Extraordinary Jurisdiction, In re J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008 (Pa. 2008).
288. Order, In re J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008 (Pa. Feb. 11, 2009) (granting motion for re-
consideration of denial of application for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction and to
amend application and appointing Hon. Arthur E. Grim, Senior Judge of Berks County, as
Special Master to act on behalf of the court to “review all Luzerne County juvenile court
adjudications and dispositions that have been affected by the recently revealed criminal
allegations, specifically including: (1) cases in which Judge Ciavarella committed juveniles
to PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC; and (2) cases in which it is
alleged that juveniles appearing before Judge Ciavarella were denied their constitutional
right to counsel”).
289. See Bridges & Steen, supra note 34, at 557–67 (noting a link between probation R
officers’ conclusions about the causes of a crime and the offender’s race).
290. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that saw adolescent offenders as immature and malleable to one will-
ing to give up on entire subsets of youth before they were even given a
chance to rehabilitate.291  More troubling, these subsets were made up
largely of minority youth.  By 2006, more than sixty-five percent of the
young people held in long-term confinement through delinquency
adjudications, and nearly seventy-two percent of those placed through
criminal convictions in the United States, were racial minorities.292
Juvenile justice advocates appear to be at a crossroads.  A decade
of declining juvenile crime rates and the public’s shift in focus over
the last eight years from schoolyards at home to battlefields abroad
and, more recently, to housing foreclosures and swelling unemploy-
ment rates, have left both stakeholders and the public less comforta-
ble with the harsh policies of the 1990s.293  Lawmakers in some states
have even begun to ratchet back their “get tough” laws.294  Even be-
yond the legislative focus on the DMC Mandate, analysts are now sug-
gesting that this “period of relative calm” in the juvenile justice world
may be rife with opportunity for meaningful reform.295
Plainly, the news media is at a critical juncture as well.  The com-
mercial pressures at play in the 1990s have only worsened, and today
both print and broadcast media outlets are struggling to survive.296
The annual State of the News Media report issued by the Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism, for example, is especially bleak.297  Increas-
ingly, consumers are turning to the Internet for their daily dose of
291. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that the justice R
system, which used to view juvenile lawbreakers as “youngsters whose crimes were the prod-
uct of immaturity,” now routinely holds those same offenders to adult criminal standards).
292. National Center for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Resi-
dential Placement, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp (last visited May 26, 2010) (fol-
low “Crosstabs” hyperlink; select “Race” under “Column Variable”; select “2006” under
“Year of Census”; select “Committed” under “General Status”; select “Adjudicated, placed
here” or “Convicted, criminal court”; select “Detention Center” and “Long-term Secure”
under “Facility Self-Classification”; then click “Show Table”).
293. SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 11. R
294. Id. at 11–12.
295. See id. at 12 (arguing that the lack of imminent concern over juvenile justice issues
presents an opportunity “to devise a model of juvenile justice that can better serve the
needs of society in the twenty-first century” before juvenile crime rates rise again and pro-
voke a harsh public response).
296. See Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media 2009,
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrative_overview_intro.php?cat=0&media=1 (last
visited May 26, 2010) (examining annual trends in media consumption and the news in-
dustry generally).
297. Id. (“This is the sixth edition of our annual report on the State of the News Media
in the United States.  It is also the bleakest.”).
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news,298 and calls for the traditional news media to “reinvent” itself
have become almost deafening.299  The problem, of course, is that the
same economic downturn that has left the news media looking for
ways to cut costs has also hit indigent communities especially hard—a
phenomenon which, historically, has led to an increase in crime
rates.300  Thus, even if they have not begun to already, juvenile crime
rates will rise again.  Whether another moral panic will ensue remains
to be seen.
A. Debiasing
Perhaps the most encouraging news that cognitive psychologists
have for us is that schematic thinking is not inevitable, and stereotypes
are not immutable.  Research shows that the automaticity of stereo-
types can be neutralized through repeated negation of stereotypic as-
sociations, affirmation of positive associations with the cohort in
question,301 and “‘social tuning,’” which can be accomplished
through relationship-building with the target.302  In other words,
when perceivers are motivated to develop a relationship with a mem-
ber of a stereotyped group,303 or to form a good impression of that
person,304 automatic stereotype activation can be inhibited.  In layper-
son’s terms, there is reason to believe that demographic diversity in
hiring and cultural competency training could help reduce the reli-
ance on schematic thinking and stereotyping by juvenile court
decisionmakers.305
Interestingly, the Department of Justice seems to agree.  In its
most recent Technical Assistance Manual, OJJDP acknowledges that
298. See id. (noting that in one survey, the number of Americans who said they got their
news online rose by nineteen percent over the last two years).
299. Id.  According to the 2009 Pew report, “[t]he problem facing American journalism
is not fundamentally an audience problem or a credibility problem [but instead] a revenue
problem—the decoupling, as we have described it before, of advertising from news.” Id.
300. See, e.g., Lauren King, Statistics Point to Increase in Crime During Recessions, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Jan. 19, 2009, at B1 (noting that statistics suggest that general crime rates often rise
during economic downturns due to a variety of factors).
301. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 248–49 (2002) (discussing suppression of stereotypes and the
promotion of opposing counter-stereotypes).
302. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 34, at 501 (promoting “social tuning” as a means R
to counter unconscious bias in the juvenile justice system); Brian S. Lowery et al., Social
Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 851–52
(2001) (reporting experimental data supporting the same conclusion).
303. Lowery et al., supra note 302, at 852. R
304. Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional: Motivated Inhibition and
Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 901 (1999).
305. See infra notes 306–18 and accompanying text. R
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“[m]isunderstandings about cultural differences and racial stereotyp-
ing frequently contribute to differential sentencing decisions for black
and white youth who have committed similar crimes.”306  The most
promising response to this phenomenon is what OJJDP calls “institu-
tionalized cultural competency training” programs that teach juvenile
court actors to “recognize and minimize the influence of cultural dif-
ferences on their decisionmaking processes.”307  OJJDP defines “cul-
tural competency” as “a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and
policies that interface with each other in a system, an agency, or a
network of professionals to work effectively in cross-cultural situa-
tions.”308  Drawing on a wealth of recent social psychological research,
OJJDP suggests that developing a conscious awareness of those cul-
tural cues that influence decisionmaking, such as demeanor and lan-
guage use, is essential to curbing cultural biases and stereotypes and
producing changes in institutional practices.309  Among other inter-
ventions, OJJDP endorses a training curriculum designed by the
American Correctional Association and the Police Executive Forum to
combat unconscious bias in individual actors and improve institu-
tional policies overall, which incorporates a “cultural diversity action
plan” focused on “self-awareness, values, prejudice, communication,
goals, and task management.”310
Especially when administered in conjunction with the adoption
of empirically based, standardized, objective decisionmaking modules
called Risk Assessment Instruments (“RAIs”), cultural competency
training can be extremely effective in reducing DMC.311  In 1999, the
Santa Cruz, California, probation department developed and imple-
mented a cultural competency staffing plan that established guide-
lines to promote bilingual hiring and prepare existing staff to provide
services to a culturally diverse client population.312  At the same time,
the department undertook a major system change strategy to develop
a culturally competent juvenile detention screening instrument.313
306. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DIS-
PROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 6-23–6-24 (2009) [here-
inafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
307. Id. at 6-24.
308. Id. at 4-13 (citation omitted).
309. Id. at 4-13–4-14.
310. Id. at 4-14.
311. See Eric Lotke & Vincent Schiraldi, The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative: The
Santa Cruz and Portland Models, in BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, NO TURNING BACK: PROMIS-
ING APPROACHES TO REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AFFECTING YOUTH OF COLOR
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 8, 11–15 (2005) (highlighting program success).
312. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 306, at 4-62. R
313. Id.
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The end product was an RAI based on a set of quantifiable risk ele-
ments (such as the seriousness of current charge, prior adjudications,
and prior court, detention, and placement history) that was intended
to be free of any criteria that could create unintentional racial bi-
ases.314  The instrument also provided an override option, whose use
was carefully monitored for racial disparities.315  The department gen-
erated monthly outcome reports, which were classified by ethnicity,
among other things.316  The results were immediate: Prior to imple-
mentation of the cultural competency plan and the RAI, Latino youth
represented thirty-three percent of the general youth population in
the County, but accounted for sixty-four percent of the daily juvenile
detention population.317  This figure fell to fifty-three percent in 1999
following the launch of the DMC initiative, and the disproportionate
rate index value for Latino youth also saw a drop.318
Finally, it is axiomatic that what may be most critical to “debias-
ing” the juvenile court is injecting the prophylactic feature most lack-
ing—accountability.  As incongruous as it sounds, the best purveyor of
accountability may be the media itself.  For years, commentators have
touted the benefits of making the criminal justice system more accessi-
ble to the media generally and broadcast media in particular.319
Greater media access would not only educate the public about the
realities of the justice system, they argue, but would also hold its actors
to a higher standard of accountability by forcing them to be more
attune to the rule of law and less to the allure of bureaucratic effi-
ciency and political convenience.320  These arguments become even
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 4-63.
318. Id.  Multnomah County, Oregon, has also seen DMC rates drop significantly
through a combination of RAIs, staff diversification, outreach to families and community
organizations, and development of new community-based alternatives to detention. Lotke
& Schiraldi, supra note 311, at 9–15. R
319. See FOX ET AL., supra note 2, at 198 (citing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE R
DOUBTS: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (1997); Steven Brill, The
Simpson Legacy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at F5; Paula Canning, Battles for Cameras in Court-
rooms Continue, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 2003, at 34, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news
items/index.php?i=6024; Douglas Lee, Florida Election Case Proved Value of Cameras in the
Courtroom, FREEDOM FORUM, Dec. 26, 2000, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/
document.asp?documentID=4104; Amy Ridenour, The Supreme Court is Wrong to Ban Camera
Coverage, NAT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS, Nov. 2000; Al Tompkins, A Case for Cameras in the Courtroom,
POYNTERONLINE, Nov. 28, 2000).  Richard Fox, Robert Van Sickel, and Thomas Steiger,
however, disagree.  They write that “contrary to the idealized prediction that greater public
exposure would bring about [a] range of public benefits . . . we believe that citizens are
simply being more misinformed.” Id. at 201.
320. Id. at 198.
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more compelling when applied to the juvenile court, an institution
that adheres only loosely to the standards of due process, whose play-
ers are largely anonymous, whose practices are often shrouded in se-
crecy, and whose population is our society’s most vulnerable.
Significantly, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, which includes some of the most powerful juvenile court “in-
siders” in the country, now agrees.  It recently endorsed a presump-
tively open court system:
Traditional notions of secrecy and confidentiality should be
re-examined and relaxed to promote public confidence in
the court’s work. . . .  The court should be open to the me-
dia, interested professionals and students and, when appro-
priate, the public, in order to hold itself accountable,
educate others, and encourage greater community
participation.321
B. Replacement Discourse
A more direct response to the influence of mediated discourse on
both DMC and on efforts to reduce it is the promotion of a “ ‘replace-
ment discourse,’” which “captures ‘the fluid nature of criminal viola-
tions and the legal processing of such infractions.’”322  According to
media critics, this can be done through crime stories which are “the-
matic” rather than “episodic” and include a “public health” perspec-
tive.323  Integral to this is the willingness of journalists to expand their
321. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ACCESS TO JUVENILE COURTS: A RE-
PORTER’S GUIDE TO PROCEEDINGS & DOCUMENTS IN THE 50 STATES & D.C. (1999), available at
http://www.rcfp.org/juvcts/index.html.
322. Gregg Barak, Media, Crime, and Justice: A Case for Constitutive Criminology, in CUL-
TURAL CRIMINOLOGY 142, 143 (Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995) (quoting Stuart
Henry & Dragan Milovanovic, The Constitution of Constitutive Criminology: A Postmodern Ap-
proach to Criminological Theory, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 130 (David Nelkin ed.,
1994)).
323. See, e.g., ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 100, at 217 (noting that “virtually every book R
ever written [about news reporting] has called for news stories to provide more context,
but to little avail”); DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 29–31 (recommending that R
journalists add “social context to the storytelling and give audiences some guideposts for
interpreting the crime”); JANE ELLEN STEVENS, REPORTING ON VIOLENCE: NEW IDEAS FOR
TELEVISION, PRINT AND WEB 10 (2001) (recommending that journalists report on the status
of violence and the public health response to violence, which will lead to more stories
about the daily incidents that “harm communities the most and cause cities to spend huge
chunks of their budgets (hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars) on police, medical
and rehabilitation expenses” and more stories on “predictable, effective methods to reduce
and prevent violence”).
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sources beyond law enforcement;324 the willingness of the news media
as an institution to increase enterprise and investigative journalism;325
and the willingness of individual media outlets to audit their own story
selection and content.326  While not explicitly aimed at reducing the
“viral” capacity of crime news reporting, they are likely to have that
effect by not only reapportioning the racial and violent content of
crime news stories but also by encouraging more associations with pos-
itive racial exemplars.
Encouragingly, some print journalists have already undertaken
these measures.  Consider the real life case of fifteen-year-old Anthony
Laster.327  On December 3, 1998, Palm Beach County School Board
police arrested Laster after grabbing two dollars from a middle school
classmate’s pocket.328  Laster is mentally challenged and hearing-im-
paired.329  Just weeks before the incident, his mother had died.330
Nonetheless, Laster was taken and held at the county’s juvenile
detention center.331  Just before Christmas, however, prosecutor Barry
Kirscher decided to make an example of Laster: “ ‘This is a robbery,’”
Kirscher declared.  Laster “‘terrorized a child and took away his
money [and Laster’s] learning disability has nothing to do with his
324. See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 27–29 (arguing that overreliance on R
traditional police sources, who have incentive to emphasize the prevalence of violent
crime, “hampers the full story on crime”); STEVENS, supra note 323, at 10 (noting that R
“reporters continue to cover crime and violence by talking only to law enforcement and
criminal justice officials and experts” and “leave out public health experts who can provide
violence prevention data, research and resources that readers and viewers can use to pre-
vent the types of violent incidents that cause them and their communities the greatest
harm”).
325. See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 14, at 31–32 (explaining that “[e]nterprise R
journalism means reporters don’t work from news releases or police scanners, but get out
from behind their desks, into the community, where a variety of sources and perspectives
can be reported”).
326. See ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 100, at 217 (recommending that the media R
“provid[e] self-critical material that offers context and clarifies the causes of the images
that appear” and suggesting, for example, that when reporting that “Black crime rates are
much higher than White,” the media also report that this “racial difference disappears if
we control for employment status”); FOX ET AL., supra note 2, at 206 (concluding that the R
“only potentially effective long-term reforms . . . lie in the realms of civic education, a
greater public awareness of the ‘problem,’ and a new sense of propriety on the part of both
the citizenry and the media”).
327. See supra Part IV.
328. Editorial, He Stole Lunch Money, So Now He’s a Criminal, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 9,
1999, at 18A.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Editorial, Send $2 Child Robber to Court for Children, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 4, 1999,
at 18A.
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capacity to commit a crime.’”332  Kirscher charged Laster with strong-
arm robbery, extortion, and petty theft.333  His case was filed directly
in the adult criminal division.334  The boy was transferred to jail where
he stayed through Christmas.335  Though his bond was set at $5000, it
took his family three weeks to redeem his mother’s insurance policy
and secure the boy’s release.336
Unlike most juvenile cases, however, Anthony Laster’s case made
headlines.  In the span of twelve weeks, dozens of articles appeared in
newspapers across the country, many decrying Kirscher’s decision.337
Some castigated Kirscher as a racist, pointing out that his office had a
track record of disproportionately arraigning African-American youth
on the harshest possible charges.338  Although he had charged Laster
as an adult, Kirscher had charged a fifteen-year-old white youth who
threatened to bomb his school in commemoration of the Columbine
massacre as a juvenile, allowing him to attend a daytime delinquency
program for adolescents.339  Others took an expressly thematic ap-
proach, deeming the Laster case yet another example of prosecutorial
overreaching, and took the opportunity to place the case within the
broader context of the “get tough” laws.340  “Juvenile justice advocates
are pointing to this Florida case as a cautionary tale of what can hap-
pen when prosecutors have the power to charge and try minors as
adults for serious offenses without having a judge review the case,” the
Boston Globe reported.341  “These advocates also say putting more
youths into the adult system means they could be exposed to violent
adult behavior while losing out on counseling and other rehabilitation
services provided through the juvenile court system.”342  The case al-
332. He Stole Lunch Money, So Now He’s a Criminal, supra note 328, at 18A. R
333. Id.
334. Send $2 Child Robber to Court for Children, supra note 331, at 18A. R
335. He Stole Lunch Money, So Now He’s a Criminal, supra note 328, at 18A. R
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., Karen Testa, Retarded Boy Faced Prison for $2 Theft, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 10,
1999, at A17.
338. Linda Breed, Brazill Case Draws National Attention, WORKERS WORLD, June 7, 2001,
available at http://www.mail-archive.com/kominform@lists.eunet.fi/msg07611.html (quot-
ing a Palm Beach County newspaper that reported “‘[h]ard-hearted Barry Kirscher wants
to send Nathaniel Brazill, 13, to the electric chair, but the record shows he’s not so hard on
renegade cops or young white folk’”).
339. Id.
340. See Louise D. Palmer, Age of Innocence? Move to Try Juveniles as Adults Comes Under
Scrutiny, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 1999, at A1 (describing increasing approval in Congress
and the White House for giving prosecutors the power to try minors who are fourteen and
older as adults).
341. Id.
342. Id.
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most made it onto prime time network news as well, but just a few days
after a 60 Minutes crew arrived in town to investigate, Kirscher
dropped the charges.343
Other pieces of “watchdog” journalism have emerged with similar
results.  In the late 1990s, for example, a veteran journalist in Arkansas
named Mary Hargrove launched a six-part series on the deplorable
conditions and rampant physical and sexual abuse in state-run juve-
nile facilities, which prompted high-level resignations and the even-
tual closure of the infamous Observation and Assessment Center in
Little Rock, Arkansas.344  In 2005, the Denver Post and Rocky Mountain
News ran a feature on juveniles serving life without parole (“LWOP”)
sentences, which zeroed in on the fact that many of the children pro-
filed had been sentenced as adults to life for their involvement in fel-
ony murders—an offense that would have resulted in a five-year
sentence had it been prosecuted in juvenile court.345  The following
year, the Colorado legislature enacted a law prohibiting juveniles
from receiving LWOP sentences altogether.346  And, of course, in
2007, hundreds of print and broadcast journalists flocked to Jena,
Louisiana, to report on the case of six African-American high school
students charged with attempted murder in the beating of a white
classmate.347
Some national news magazines have also gotten into the act over
the last decade by rounding out their typical crime reporting with
343. Karen Testa, Case Dropped Against Disabled Boy Who Took $2, STUART NEWS, Mar. 5,
1999, at A8.
344. Mary Hargrove, When Juveniles Are Locked Up: A Reporter Uncovers Abuse in a System Few
People Know Exists, NEIMAN REPORTS, Winter 1998, at 30–32.  The series tapped myriad
sources, including Arkansas’s Department of Human Services, and took Hargrove months
to compile. Id.
345. See, e.g., Gwen Florio et al., Life for Death: Should Teen Murderers Get a Second Chance at
Freedom?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 17, 2005, at 1A (profiling Colorado inmates who were
convicted of murder between the ages of fourteen and seventeen and were charged as
adults).
346. SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 267. R
347. Christie, supra note 163 (noting that “[f]rom September 7, 2006, to October 12, R
2007, the Associated Press distributed 74 stories about the Jena nooses, 52 on state wires,
38 on national wires, 22 on North American wires and five on southern regional wires,”
and on September 20, 2007, an estimated 20,000 people from around the Nation held
rallies in Jena).  One of the chief retrospective complaints about the Jena coverage, how-
ever, is that with the exception of some local Louisiana papers, most journalists took as
gospel facts about the case disseminated by interested bloggers and failed to do any inde-
pendent investigation of their own. Id. (quoting a column by Jena Times Assistant Editor
Franklin, which stated that “the media simply formed their stories based on one side’s
statements about the Jena 6 . . . were downright lazy in their efforts to find the truth . . .
[or] simply reported what they’d read on blogs, which expressed only one side of the
issue”).
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contextual information on the causes of juvenile offending. Time and
Newsweek, for example, both ran issue features on the links between
adolescent brain development and behavior.348  For the most part,
however, broadcast media has been a hold-out.  While enterprise re-
porting remains the core of television news magazines like 60 Minutes
and Frontline, it has all but disappeared from many of the networks.349
Analysts blame a host of industry developments, from deregulation,
which has facilitated ownership of broadcast media outlets by com-
mercially driven corporations, to the flurry of high-profile lawsuits
launched during the 1990s, which have made investigative reporting a
“magnet[ ] for legal action.”350
C. The DMC Mandate
One of the most remarkable aspects of these trends was that they
occurred during a period when the federal government was taking
almost unprecedented steps to remedy the problem of racial dispro-
portionality in the juvenile justice system.  In 1987, the Coalition for
Juvenile Justice issued a report entitled An Act of Empowerment, which
discussed the “special problem of the treatment of minorities and
348. See Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teen Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/82963 (discussing how brain development could explain
behavioral characteristics of teenagers, including poor decisionmaking and lack of self
control); Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, Sept. 26, 2008, available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,994126,00.html (surveying scientific re-
search on how teenage brain development influences behavior, including the ability of
teens to read emotional signals from others and assess the risks associated with their
decisions).
349. Melissa Guthrie, Investigative Journalism Under Fire: Shrinking Budgets and Concerns
over Legal Risk Have Hurt a Vital Genre, BROADCASTING & CABLE, June 22, 2008, available at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/114234-Investigative_Journalism_Under_Fire.
php.
350. Id. According to some media critics, however, government may have a role to play
in reducing the negative externalities of broadcast media.  Professor Leonard Baynes, for
example, has argued that the FCC should take action to revoke the licenses of broadcasters
“who have no people of color in their prime-time programs or disproportionately portray
people of color in a stereotypical manner.”  Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and
Stereotyping of People of Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming,
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 299 (2003).  More generally, Professor Jerry Kang suggests that the
FCC has the power to restrict “ ‘bad’” and promote “‘good’” broadcast content.  Kang,
supra note 2, at 1543.  While print media is generally insulated, the FCC has the ability to R
regulate broadcast media to promote the “public interest.” Id. at 1542–43.  Kang advocates
pushing the FCC, through public comment to any future Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
a court challenge via the Administrative Procedure Act, and/or a Notice of Inquiry to
recode the “public interest” standards in ways that would, at the very least, “shine a new
light on racial meanings generated and delivered throughout all media.” Id. at 1568–72.
In the context of juvenile justice, protecting the public interest may be even more compel-
ling when the cohort being harmed is per se politically powerless by virtue of its age.
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American Natives caught up in the juvenile justice system” and made
detailed recommendations for addressing the problem.351  Armed
with this and a series of recent empirical studies documenting wide-
spread racial disproportionality at multiple decision points in jurisdic-
tions throughout the country,352 juvenile justice advocates lobbied
Congress to amend the JJDPA.
One of the 1988 amendments to the JJDPA required states receiv-
ing funding from the Title II, Part B Formula Grants Program353 to
investigate the problem of disproportionate minority confinement in
secure facilities and to develop action plans to address its causes.354
This has become known as the “DMC Mandate” or “DMC Initiative.”
Specifically, if the proportion of a given group of minority youth de-
tained or confined in its secure detention facilities, secure correc-
tional facilities, jails, and lockups exceeded the proportion that group
represented in the general population, the DMC Mandate required
the state in question to develop and implement plans to reduce the
disproportionality.355  The DMC Mandate was elevated to a core re-
quirement of the JJDPA in 1992,356 and a decade later was expanded
to encompass disproportionality not only in confinement, but at every
processing point within the juvenile justice system.357
The passage of the DMC Mandate was historic, as it purported to
redress not only those disparities caused by overt race bias, but also
those caused by the structural conditions endemic to the institutions
that produced them.  The problem, however, is that with the excep-
351. THE NAT’L COALITION OF STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUPS, AN ACT OF EM-
POWERMENT 3 (1987).
352. See, e.g., Barry Krisberg et al., The Incarceration of Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ.
173, 178–90 (1987) (discussing trends in juvenile incarceration between 1977 and 1982
based on statistics from the U.S. Bureau of the Census).
353. The Formula Grants Program makes federal funds available to states “to support
State and local programs that prevent juvenile involvement in delinquent behavior.”  42
U.S.C. § 5602(1) (2006).  Under the program, OJJDP determines the amount for which
each state is eligible using a formula based on the state’s juvenile population.  See 28 C.F.R.
§ 31.301(a) (2009) (“Funds shall be allocated annually among the States on the basis of
relative population of persons under age eighteen.”).  To be eligible for the program, a
State must submit a comprehensive three-year plan setting forth the State’s proposal for
meeting the mandates and goals outlined in the JJDPA.  42 U.S.C. § 5633(a).  The State’s
plan is amended annually to reflect new programming and initiatives to be undertaken by
the State and local units of government. Id.
354. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7258(c), 102 Stat. 4439, 4440 (1988) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(23) (2006)).
355. Id.
356. Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(A)(ii), 106 Stat. 4982, 4993–94 (1992) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)).
357. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 12209(1)(P), 116 Stat. 1873, 1878 (2002) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)).
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tion of a few jurisdictions, it simply has not done so.  Perhaps the most
obvious indicator of this fact is that since 1990, national DMC rates for
arrest, placement, and detention have barely budged, while the adult
court waiver rate has had only a moderate decrease.358  At the state
level, some jurisdictions have used Formula Grant funds to make a
genuine dent in DMC rates, but most have not.  In fact, despite study
after study revealing statistically significant race effects on juvenile
court processing, some insiders continue to insist that DMC is the
product of differential offending alone.359
The sources of the DMC Mandate’s ineffectiveness have defied
consensus.  Some blame the Mandate’s vague and ineffectual regula-
tory language,360 others cite inadequate funding,361 others OJJDP’s
seemingly lax and arbitrary enforcement,362 while still others focus on
the failure of state-level bureaucrats and institutional actors to em-
brace and implement proven remedies.363  National DMC expert
James Bell of San Francisco’s W. Haywood Burns Institute boils it
down to a simple metaphor.  State actors will embrace efforts to re-
duce DMC if one of two things happens, he explains: They “feel the
heat” or they “see the light.”364  Currently, the Burns Institute and
other advocacy groups across the country are lobbying Congress to
turn up the “heat.”  As of mid-2010, pending before the Senate is Sen-
ate Bill 678, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
358. PUZZANCHERA & ADAMS, supra note 199. R
359. Leiber, supra note 23, at 15–16. R
360. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: Protecting
Our Children and Our Communities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
230–31 (2007) [hereinafter JJDPA Reauthorization Hearing] (statement of Richard Miranda,
Chief, Tucson Police Department) (“This vague requirement that states ‘address’ efforts to
reduce DMC has left state and local officials without a clear mandate or guidance for re-
ducing racial and ethnic disparities.”); BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 53, at 15–16 (arguing R
that “[c]urrent federal mandates do not provide guidance or engagement”).
361. See, e.g., JJDPA Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 360, at 3 (statement of Sen. Rus- R
sell D. Feingold) (“As the Federal commitment has dropped off, there is some evidence
suggesting that the rate of violent juvenile crime, which had been declining steadily for
many years, has begun in the past couple of years to climb again.”); id. at 214 (testimony of
Deidre Wilson Garton, Chair, Wisconsin Governor’s Juvenile Justice Commission) (“Yet, as
Federal funds have been severely cut and earmarked over the last seven years, gains are
reversing and correctional placements are rising . . . .”).
362. See, e.g., Leiber, supra note 23, at 16–17, 28 app. D (discussing disparities between R
different states’ assessment programs); see also BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 53, at 15–16 R
(discussing how the lack of strategy, guidance, and consistent standards have contributed
to the ineffectiveness of state DMC plans).
363. See, e.g., DAHLBERG, supra note 56, at 1–2 (discussing Massachusetts’s continued fail- R
ure to comply with the DMC Mandate).
364. Telephone Interview with Laura John Ridolfi, Law & Policy Analyst, W. Haywood
Burns Inst. (Aug. 20, 2009).
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Reauthorization Act of 2009, a bill that is supposed to strengthen the
provisions of the DMC Mandate by providing more explicit and strin-
gent guidance to states and localities.365  What has garnered far less
attention is the “light,” or, more specifically, why it is that many insid-
ers still do not seem to see it.
I claim that the superpredator discourse may be a source of this
obscurity.  Admittedly, some obscurity is inevitable, because stakehold-
ers, like most of us, are inherently motivated to defend and justify
their beliefs and those of the systems of which they are a part.  Often
referred to as “system justification,” this theory posits that members of
organizations plagued by injustice will often rely on stereotypes or
“system justifying biases” to explain and legitimate their existing prac-
tices even in the face of evidence that those practices contribute to the
injustice.366  Yet, I claim that racially “tinged” social discourses, like
the superpredator discourse, can bolster this predisposition to ration-
alize the status quo by perpetuating negative stereotypes of the victim-
ized cohort.  In the DMC context, the superpredator meme
reinforced the biased perception that juveniles of color were incarcer-
ated in disproportionate numbers not because the juvenile justice sys-
tem was infirm, but because they were inherently more deviant than
their white counterparts.367  This, in turn, led insiders to cling to ex-
isting institutional structures and practices, even when presented with
viable alternatives.  At times, these system justifying motives mani-
fested themselves as overt opposition to the Mandate.  As long as the
public continued to believe that minority offenders were inherently
deviant and predatory, stakeholders had a political incentive to de-
nounce or at the very least ignore claims that these juveniles were “vic-
tims” of the system.  More often, however, the system justifying
motives manifested themselves implicitly in the form of the individual
apathy and collective intransigence that seem to have hampered
meaningful progress in most jurisdictions.
365. S. 678, 111th Cong. (2009) (reauthorizing and improving the Juvenile Justice and
Prevention Act of 1974).
366. See, e.g., Blasi & Jost, supra note 58, at 1123–25 (discussing how System Justification R
Theory suggests that people are motivated to accept and perpetuate existing social
arrangements).
367. This is illustrated in one recent study that found that even subliminal associations
with race could prompt juvenile justice officials to overattribute the criminal behavior of
minority youth to negative internal traits (such as moral depravity) and the criminal behav-
ior of white youth to external forces (such as deviant peers or a dysfunctional family). See
Graham & Lowery, supra note 34, at 484 (discussing the study on subliminal associations R
with race).
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Finally, this analysis has broader implications for the increasingly
heated debate over the ascendance of the so-called “unconscious bias
discourse.”  In an article published just last year entitled (How) Does
Unconscious Bias Matter? Stanford Law Professors Ralph Richard Banks
and Richard Thompson Ford argue that despite its undeniable politi-
cal appeal in advancing conversations about race by “sever[ing] the
link between the moral blameworthiness of the individual, and the
wrongness of the resulting discrimination,”368 the discourse is “as
likely to subvert as to further the goal of substantive racial justice.”369
Beyond the empirical unreliability of the IAT and the failure of the
unconscious bias approach to describe adequately the nature and ori-
gins of racial inequity, they lament that the rhetoric of unconscious
bias risks diverting attention away “from problems of substantive ine-
quality.”370  Rather than focus on “mental state” and antidiscrimina-
tion law, reformers should concentrate on policy.371
One such policy is, of course, the DMC Mandate.  In a 2007 arti-
cle entitled Disparity Rules, Columbia Professor Olatunde C.A. Johnson
cites the DMC Mandate as a promising statutory alternative to the
traditional disparate impact regime as a means of redressing systemic
disparities.372  “The potential practical power of the [DMC Mandate]
is that it provides a mechanism for encouraging a public institution
not only to uncover bias in its practices (both explicit and implicit),
but also to examine more broadly how its practices work to reproduce
or exacerbate racial disadvantage.”373  Like Banks and Ford, Johnson
suggests that advocates and academics must look beyond unconscious
bias to “combat structural patterns of racial inequality.”374
In some respects, Banks, Ford, and Johnson are right.  Address-
ing the cognitive pathologies that contribute to biased decisionmak-
ing cannot be the sole objective of antidiscrimination efforts.  The
problem is that unless these pathologies are accounted for and sur-
mounted, the broader structural reforms they seek (whether achieved
through enhanced intra-institutional accountability measures, objec-
tive risk assessments, or something else altogether) may never even
368. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Mat-
ter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1104 (2009).
369. Id. at 1110.
370. Id. at 1054, 1110–21.
371. Id. at 1054, 1120–21.
372. Johnson, supra note 54, at 374 (“[DMC] is potentially more far-reaching than tradi- R
tional disparate impact standards . . . .  The DMC approach innovatively responds to the
complex mechanisms that sustain contemporary racial inequality.”).
373. Id. at 380.
374. Id. at 374.
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get off the ground.  In this sense, this Article suggests that mental state
and policy reform may be inextricably entwined.  While unconscious
bias need not be the express target of antidiscrimination policies
themselves, it should be the target of efforts to implement those poli-
cies, particularly amid a climate of pronounced racial antipathy to-
ward the cohort those policies are designed to protect.  The DMC
Mandate is case in point.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly a year into what has been called America’s “post-racial”
era, significant racial and ethnic disparities continue to plague nearly
every public system and institution in this country.  Increasingly, regu-
latory provisions like the DMC Mandate have emerged to do what our
courts will not—redress not only those disparities caused by overt race
bias, but also those caused by the structural conditions endemic to the
institutions that produced them.  Plainly promising on paper, how-
ever, emerging laws like the Kentucky Racial Justice Act,375 which
targets disparities in capital punishment,376 share a common feature
with the DMC Mandate: They have been largely ineffective in
practice.377
As advocates and legislators work to pinpoint the sources of their
stagnation, I suggest that they may want to look to not only the legisla-
tion in question, but also the mediated discourses that may have both
contributed to the disparities and undercut the legislation’s normative
aims.  The juvenile justice system is informative.  While it is impossible
to quantify the impact that the “superpredator discourse” may have
had on either disproportionate minority contact or legislative efforts
to reduce it, the evidence (albeit imperfect) is compelling.  We know
that the 1990s witnessed a period of unprecedented mediated antipa-
thy toward juvenile offenders of color, which culminated in the icono-
graphic demonization of the adolescent superpredator.  We also know
that this type of racialized discourse drives public opinion and readily
activates the implicit racial biases of its consumers—biases that have
been linked to more punitive outcomes for offenders of color.  Fi-
375. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300–.309 (West 2009).  For example, one provision of
the statute provides that “[n]o person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death that
was sought on the basis of race.” Id. § 532.300(1).
376. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 238 (2007) (explaining that Kentucky enacted such legislation to
“address racial disparities in the death penalty”).
377. See id. (“While Kentucky’s Racial Justice Act should give advocates hope for the
possibility of reform at the state level, it is less clear whether the legislation has been imple-
mented successfully.”).
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nally, we know that these biases enhance stakeholders’ natural ten-
dency to rationalize and legitimate their existing practices, even when
presented with evidence that those practices are unjust.  Cumulatively,
this evidence suggests that the media had an indirect but meaningful
impact on both racial disparities in the juvenile justice system and on
the DMC Mandate’s failure to reduce them.  While this syllogistic con-
nection among mediated discourse, racial bias, racial disparity, and
remedial stagnation does not constitute proof of causation, I suggest it
should, at the very least, encourage those legislators, advocates, and
academics currently consumed with the fight against entrenched ra-
cial disparities to consider this connection carefully.
